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ABSTRACT
A recurring, foundational issue for evidence-based regulation is
deciding whether to extend governmental approval from an existing
use with sufficient current evidence of safety and efficacy to a novel
use for which such evidence is currently lacking. This “extrapolation”
issue arises in the medicines context when an approved drug or device
that is already being marketed is being considered (1) for new
conditions (such as off-label diagnostic categories), (2) for new
patients (such as new subpopulations), (3) for new dosages or
durations, or (4) as the basis for approving a related drug or device
(such as a generic or biosimilar drug). Although the logic of
preapproval testing and the precautionary principle—first, do no
harm—would counsel in favor of prohibiting extrapolation approvals
until after traditional safety and efficacy evidence exists, such delays
would unreasonably sacrifice beneficial uses. The harm of accessing
unsafe products must be balanced against the harm of restricting
access to effective products. In fact, the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA’s) current regulations in many ways reject the
precautionary principle because they largely permit individual
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physicians to prescribe medications for off-label uses before any
testing tailored to those uses has been done. The FDA’s approach
empowers physicians, but overshoots the mark by allowing enduring
use of drugs and devices with insubstantial support of safety and
efficacy. This Article instead proposes a more dynamic and evolving
evidence-based regime that charts a course between the Scylla and
Charybdis of the overly conservative precautionary principle on one
hand, and the overly liberal FDA regime on the other.
Our approach calls for improvements in reporting, testing, and
enforcement regulations to provide a more layered and nuanced
system of regulatory incentives. First, we propose a more
thoroughgoing reporting of off-label use (via the disclosure of
diagnostic codes and “detailing” data) in manufacturers’ annual
reports to the FDA, in the adverse event reports to the FDA, in
Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement requests, and, for a subset of
FDA-designated drugs, in prescriptions themselves. Second, we would
substantially expand the agency’s utilization of postmarket testing,
and we provide a novel framework for evaluating the need for
postmarket testing. Finally, our approach calls for a tiered labeling
system that would allow regulators and courts to draw finer
reimbursement and liability distinctions among various drug uses,
and would provide the agency both the regulatory teeth and the
flexibility it presently lacks. Together, these reforms would improve
the role of the FDA in the informational marketplace underlying
physicians’ prescribing decisions. This evolutionary extrapolation
framework could also be applied to other contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
A recurring issue for evidence-based regulation of medicine is
deciding whether to extend governmental approval from an existing
use with sufficient current evidence of safety and efficacy to a novel
use for which such evidence is currently lacking. This “extrapolation”
issue can arise in four main contexts. First, “diagnosis extrapolation”
occurs when physicians want to use an existing drug or device to treat
a new condition (for example, using Seroquel to treat anxiety instead
of schizophrenia). Second, “patient extrapolation” occurs when
physicians want to use an existing drug or device to treat a new
population with a given condition (for example, using Seroquel to
treat children instead of adults). Third, “dosage extrapolation” occurs
when physicians want to use an existing drug or device for a new
duration or schedule of use, or at a new dosage (for example, using
Seroquel indefinitely for schizophrenia when studies have only
analyzed six weeks of use). Finally, “treatment extrapolation” occurs
when physicians want to use a new drug or device that is related to an
approved counterpart (for example, using extended-release Seroquel
1
based on evidence that conventional Seroquel is safe and effective).
The logic of preapproval testing, and the precautionary
2
principle—first, do no harm —would counsel toward prohibiting
extrapolation approvals until after traditional safety and efficacy
evidence exists with regard to the subjects that match the diagnostic
class, patient class, dosage class, and treatment class. Yet the Food
and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) current regulations in many ways
1. Seroquel (Quetiapine Fumarate) Tablets: Full Prescribing Information, ASTRAZENECA,
available at http://www1.astrazeneca-us.com/pi/Seroquel.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
2. HIPPOCRATES, OF THE EPIDEMICS bk. I, § 2(5) (Francis Adams trans., 2009).
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reject the precautionary principle because they allow individual
physicians to prescribe medications for off-label uses before any
testing tailored to those uses has been done. This Article charts a
course between the Scylla and Charybdis of the overly conservative
precautionary principle on one hand, and the overly liberal FDA
regime on the other. We instead propose a more dynamic and
evolving evidence-based regime. Just as probationary hiring can be
3
dynamically efficient in the employment context, we argue that when
ex ante due diligence is overly costly, a system that allows interim
periods of use can provide physicians and patients greater treatment
options while providing regulators with valuable evidence about the
safety and efficacy of the proposed extrapolation. In contrast, a
precautionary requirement—which would condition all approvals on
pre-existing evidence for uses that constitute just slight extrapolations
along any of these four dimensions—sacrifices probable short-term
health benefits at the altar of precaution. Harm is not associated only
with permitting access to unsafe products, but also with restricting
access to beneficial products. The existing off-label regime captures
the short-term benefits of extrapolation, but fails to sufficiently deter
the long-term harms of perpetual prescribing into potentially
hazardous off-label uses.
This Article instead calls for improvements in reporting, testing,
and enforcement regulations to provide a more layered and dynamic
system of regulatory incentives. The first element of our proposal is to
improve the reporting of the amount and effect of off-label
extrapolations through a more comprehensive reporting of off-label
use (via the disclosure of diagnostic codes and “detailing” data) in
manufacturers’ annual reports to the FDA, in the adverse event
reports to the FDA, in Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement requests,
and, for a subset of FDA-designated drugs, in the prescriptions
themselves. The agency could then disseminate the de-identified
4
information it collects to allow third parties, such as academics,
3. For a discussion, see generally Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red
Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEXAS L. REV.
1485 (1996); Ian Ayres, Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, Optimal Voting Rules for TwoMember Tenure Committees, 36 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 323 (2011) (discussing academic
tenure and, more generally, the practice of “up-or-out” hiring rules commonly found in law,
business, and the military).
4. De-identified data has had individually identifiable health information removed so that
it cannot be linked to a particular individual. Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance:
Using Health Information Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225, 255
(2013).
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insurers, pharmaceutical companies, and patient organizations, to
complement its internal analyses. The second element of our proposal
is the expansion of the FDA’s utilization of postmarket testing
requirements with regard to off-label drug use, and we provide a
novel framework for evaluating whether postmarket testing is
necessary.
Finally, the third element of our proposal is to create a tiered
labeling system that would allow regulators and courts to draw finer
reimbursement and liability distinctions. The FDA should create a
category of “red box” warnings designed to completely prohibit
certain off-label uses, require informed consent from patients for a
subset of existing “black box” warnings, and create a category of
“gray box” warnings to block Medicare Part D and Medicaid
reimbursement by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS). Our labeling system could also be used to motivate
pharmaceutical companies to comply with postmarket testing
requirements using both sticks (the threat of boxed warnings with the
attendant risk of tort liability) and carrots (a category of “conditional
off-label use” that would allow limited promotion). The improved
reporting, testing, and enforcement regulations would work together
to produce a more layered range of regulatory responses. The FDA,
armed with better information about the extent of off-label use and
its adverse effects, would be in a better position to require postmarket
testing and to discourage off-label use with new types of warnings if
manufacturers failed to provide sufficient, timely evidence of safety
and efficacy in that particular extrapolation.
Our dynamic extrapolation approach is consonant with
important parts of the FDA’s current statutory authority, which calls
on the agency to proactively respond to new sources of information
and allows the FDA flexibility to require postmarket studies.
Importantly, at least with regard to prescription drugs, our proposal
could be entirely or largely adopted without the need for statutory
amendment. Further, it should minimally strain the FDA’s limited
resources because it relies on informational regulation and marketbased mechanisms to influence off-label prescribing practices.
In light of recent jurisprudence, the need for the agency to adapt
in order to play a greater role in the informational marketplace that
underlies physicians’ prescribing decisions has never been more
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critical. In 2012, in United States v. Caronia, the Second Circuit stated
that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not prohibit
truthful off-label promotion, and that such prohibitions would violate
6
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court expanded the protection
afforded to advertising and marketing in the pharmaceutical field in
7
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center and Sorrell v. IMS
8
Health. These cases provide momentum for the industry’s battle to
9
secure increased First Amendment protection. Our tiered labeling
system, in contrast to agency prohibitions on manufacturer speech, is
in line with the Brandeis notion that the remedy for bad speech is
10
more speech.
The FDA is also under pressure from strong consumerist
objections to direct agency compulsion in connection with off-label
use in clinical areas that tend to resist standardization, such as
oncology. Our evolutionary evidence-based approach is also
consonant with the general practice of allowing physicians to
prescribe off-label uses in accordance with their professional
judgment and knowledge. An optimal system would give physicians
the flexibility to extrapolate on an individual level within reason, but
would also ensure the collection of off-label experience data to be
used for assessing whether the new-diagnostic, new-patient, newdosage, or new-treatment extrapolation is warranted.
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts. Part I
provides background on current extrapolation practices surrounding
three concerns: reporting, testing, and enforcement. Part II proposes
reforms, and Part III uses the case studies of the drug Seroquel and
the medical device Lap-Band to illustrate how this system might
5. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
6. Id. at 166–67.
7. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). In Thompson, the Court held
that it was unconstitutional for the FDA to prohibit pharmacies from advertising that they
compounded specific drugs. Id. at 376–77.
8. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). In Sorrell, the Court held unconstitutional
a Vermont statute that prohibited pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber-identifying
information for marketing purposes. Id. at 2672.
9. Earlier, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 3d 51 (D.D.C. 1998),
the court held that an FDA guidance restricting certain forms of manufacturer promotion of offlabel uses imposed unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech under the First
Amendment. Id. at 74–75, vacated as moot sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d
331, 336–37 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
10. “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
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work. Although this Article focuses primarily on prescription drugs,
the central elements of our framework apply to the regulation of
medical devices, to over-the-counter drugs, and even to food safety.
Indeed, as outlined in the Conclusion, our solution of evolutionary
extrapolation can be seen as a type of Bayesian decisionmaking that
is appropriate for a broad class of regulatory extrapolations that arise
11
in a wide variety of legislative and rulemaking contexts.
I. WHY THE CURRENT REGIME IS INSUFFICIENTLY DYNAMIC
A. Overview of the Approval Process
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a federal
regulatory agency within the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) that approves and regulates drugs within the United
12
States. The FDA’s primary mission is to protect the American
public’s health, which the agency accomplishes when it ensures that
13
drugs and medical devices are safe and effective. Within the FDA,
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), the largest of
the FDA’s five centers, evaluates prescription and over-the-counter
drugs’ safety and efficacy through premarket approval and
14
postmarket regulation.
Premarket approval is a rigorous process that a drug must go
through before the FDA will consider the drug to be safe and
effective for human use. This premarket process has several stages.
First, a product sponsor (a pharmaceutical company), having

11. See generally SIMON JACKMAN, BAYESIAN ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(2009).
12. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012).
13. Id. § 393(b)(1)–(4); see SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R41983, HOW FDA
APPROVES DRUGS AND REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 1–2 (2012), available
at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41983.pdf (“[The] FDA also regulates products other than
drugs—for example, biological products, medical devices, dietary supplements, foods, cosmetics,
animal drugs, and tobacco products.”).
14. How Drugs are Developed and Approved, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www
.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved (last updated
Oct. 23, 2014) (stating that “the other four FDA centers have responsibility for medical and
radiological devices, food, and cosmetics, biologics, and veterinary drugs”); see THAUL, supra
note 13, at 1–2 (“First, FDA reviews the safety and effectiveness of new drugs . . . this process is
called premarket approval . . . . Second, once a drug has passed that threshold and is FDAapproved, FDA acts through its postmarket or post-approval regulatory procedures.”). For a
simplified visual explanation of this process, see Drug Approval Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm284393.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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screened a drug for pharmacological activity and acute toxicity in
animals, must submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application
15
to the FDA. The FDA will review the IND and, if the agency is
persuaded that clinical studies will not unreasonably place human
16
subjects at risk, will authorize clinical trials.
After completing clinical trials, the product sponsor can submit a
formal application, known as a New Drug Application (NDA), to the
FDA for marketing approval. Of the twenty therapeutic drugs
approved in 2008, the median time for agency approval of an NDA
17
was 10.9 months. The median time from FDA authorization to initial
18
testing in humans to market approval was 6.5 years. If a drug passes
the FDA’s review process, the FDA will approve the drug for a
particular indication in a specific population.
An NDA also contains proposed labeling that must be approved
prior to marketing. This labeling is a summary of the evidence
supporting the safe and effective use of the drug. The primary
purpose of drug labeling is to give healthcare providers the necessary
information for appropriate prescription, but patients may also find

15. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www
.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/
approvalapplications/investigationalnewdrugindapplication/default.htm (last updated Oct. 26,
2014).
16. Phase I trials are safety-focused: they typically involve “between 20 and 80” “healthy
volunteers” and seek “to determine dosing, document how a drug is metabolized and excreted,
and identify acute side effects.” Information for Consumers (Drugs): The FDA’s Drug Review
Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last updated May 28, 2014). In
Phase II, the drug is tested on a larger group of between one hundred and three hundred
individuals who “have the disease or condition that the product potentially could treat.” Id.
Researchers continue to assess the drug’s safety, but also begin evaluating its efficacy in treating
the targeted disease or condition. Id. After Phase II, a drug is subjected to a balancing test of
sorts: if the gravity of known risks to patients is outweighed by the efficacy of the drug and the
severity of the disease it treats, the drug proceeds to Phase III. Information for Consumers
(Drugs): Inside Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People, What is a Clinical Trial?,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/
ucm143531.htm (last updated Apr. 12, 2013). The third and usually final trial involves between
one thousand and three thousand subjects with the targeted disease or condition, designed to
gather data on safety, independent efficacy, side effects, and relative efficacy, as compared with
other available treatments. Id.
17. Thomas J. Moore & Curt D. Furberg, Development Times, Clinical Testing, Postmarket
Follow-up, and Safety Risks for the New Drugs Approved by the US Food and Drug
Administration: The Class of 2008, 174 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 90, 92 (2014).
18. Id.

ABBOTT AYRES IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

11/17/2014 8:34 PM

EVIDENCE AND EXTRAPOLATION

385

19

drug labeling to be a source of useful information. In recent years,
the FDA has revised its labeling requirements to include more
20
information and to be more accessible to physicians. Drug labeling is
an important risk-communication tool for the agency, as it alerts
providers to, among other things, warnings and precautions,
contraindications, adverse reactions, drug interactions, recommended
21
use for specific populations, dosage, and administration. In addition
to standard warnings and precautions, labels may also include boxed
22
or “black-box” warnings that alert prescribers to special risks. “The
warnings are separated (and thus highlighted) from other text in the
23
package labeling by a prominent black-box border.” Black-box
warnings—the “highest level of all drug warnings promulgated by the
24
FDA” —may be required in a number of situations in which the
25
FDA is aware of potentially high risks associated with the drug.
19. Mary E. Kremzner & Steven F. Osborne, An Introduction to the Improved FDA
Prescription Drug Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.fda
.gov/downloads/Training/ForHealthProfessionals/UCM090796.pdf. For certain prescription
drugs, the agency does require patient labeling, called Medication Guides or Patient Package
inserts. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The Code of Federal Regulations provides:
Certain contraindications or serious warnings, particularly those that may lead to
death or serious injury, may be required by the FDA to be presented in a box. The
boxed warning ordinarily must be based on clinical data . . . . The box must contain, in
uppercase letters, a heading inside the box that includes the word “WARNING” and
conveys the general focus of the information in the box. The box must briefly explain
the risk and refer to more detailed information in the “Contraindications” or
“Warnings and Precautions” section, accompanied by the identifying number for the
section or subsection containing the detailed information.
21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1) (2014); see id. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2014) (permitting the FDA to require
black-box warnings relating to unapproved uses if “such usage is associated with a clinically
significant risk or hazard”).
23. Karen E. Lasser, Diane L. Seger, Tony Yu, Andrew S. Karson, Julie M. Fiskio, Andrew
C. Seger, Nidhi R. Shah, Tejal K. Gandhi, Jeffrey M. Rothschild & David W. Bates, Adherence
to Black Box Warnings for Prescription Medications in Outpatients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 338, 338 (2006).
24. Kylene Halloran & Paul G. Barash, Inside the Black Box: Current Policies and
Concerns with the United States Food and Drug Administration’s Highest Drug Safety Warning
System, 23 CURRENT OPINION ANESTHESIOLOGY 423, 423 (2010).
25. The FDA has stopped short of clearly articulating the criteria it uses in evaluating
whether black-box warnings should be required, but it has identified three general situations in
which such warnings would be appropriate:
1. There is an adverse reaction so serious in proportion to the potential benefit (for
example, a fatal, life-threatening, or permanently disabling adverse reaction) that it
must be considered in assessing the risks and benefits of using the drug.
2. There is a serious reaction that can be prevented or reduced in frequency or
severity by patient selection, careful monitoring, avoiding certain concomitant
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If the FDA determines safety measures are needed beyond the
labeling, the agency can require the sponsor to develop a Risk
26
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies plan (REMS). A REMS is
required preapproval if the agency determines safety measures are
needed beyond the professional labeling, and a REMS may also be
required after a drug is approved if the agency becomes aware of new
27
safety information. No two REMS are identical: each REMS has
unique safety measures designed to mitigate risks associated with a
particular drug or class of drugs. A REMS may include a medication
guide or patient package-insert requirement, a communication plan,

therapy, addition of another drug, or managing the patient in a specific manner or
avoiding use in a specific clinical situation.
3. The FDA approved the drug with restrictions on use and distribution to assure
safe use.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH & CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: WARNINGS AND
PRECAUTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND BOXED WARNING SECTIONS OF LABELING FOR
HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – CONTENT AND FORMAT (Oct.
2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm075096.pdf.
26. “The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) gave FDA
the authority to require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) from manufacturers
to ensure that the benefits of a drug or biological product outweigh its risks.” Postmarket Drug
Safety Information for Patients and Providers: Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarket
drugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm111350.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2014).
Prior to the FDAAA, the FDA used Risk Minimization Plans (RiskMaps) to influence
physician and patient practices. RiskMaps are now integrated into the REMS regulatory
infrastructure. Postmarket Drug Safety Information for Patients and Providers: Isotretinoin
(Marketed as Accutane) Capsule Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.
fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm0943
05.htm (last updated Oct. 22, 2010). Isotretinoin (Accutain) is a prominent example of a
medicine with a robust RiskMap (iPledge) for pregnancy prevention in female patients. It has
extensive requirements, such as monthly pregnancy tests, intended to prevent fetal exposure in
patients taking isotretinoin. THE IPLEDGE PROGRAM, THE GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES FOR
THE IPLEDGE PROGRAM (Apr. 2012), available at https://www.ipledgeprogram.com/Documents/
Guide%20to%20Best%20Practices%20-%20iPLEDGE%20Program.pdf. A sponsor report in
February 2009 stated that forty physicians had been terminated from iPledge, primarily for
misrepresenting information regarding patient gender and the date of the required pregnancy
test. These discrepancies were largely reported by pharmacists and patients. Peggy Peck, SDEF:
FDA iPledge Program Sanctions 30 Physicians, MEDPAGE TODAY (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.medpagetoday.com/MeetingCoverage/SDEF/12890.
27. Some pharmaceutical companies submit a REMS voluntarily. U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION &
RESEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY FORMAT AND CONTENT OF PROPOSED RISK
EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES, REMS ASSESSMENTS, AND PROPOSED REMS
MODIFICATIONS 6 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/
UCM184128.pdf.
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and elements to assure safe use (ETASU). ETASU are the most
extensive potential components of a REMS, and they set out actions
that providers and organizations must take prior to prescribing or
dispensing a drug, or, in some cases, as a condition of allowing a
29
patient to continue treatment. The ETASU may require special
certification of practitioners, pharmacies, offices, and hospitals; may
limit the settings in which a drug can be dispensed; or may mandate
laboratory tests, registration, or other monitoring of individual
30
patients.
The FDA can also make approval conditional upon
postmarketing requirements (PMRs) or postmarketing commitments
(PMCs), which are studies and clinical trials that sponsors conduct
after approval to gather additional information about a product’s
31
safety, efficacy, or optimal use.
B. The Off-Label Challenge—Balancing Access and Harm
Prevention
As a general matter, once a drug is approved, physicians may
32
prescribe the drug without restriction. Prescribing according to
28. Id. at 5–6. REMS also require a timetable for sponsor submission to the agency of an
assessment on the impact of a REMS. Id. at 5.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id.
31. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, ADVANCES IN FDA’S SAFETY PROGRAM FOR MARKETED
DRUGS: ESTABLISHING PREMARKET SAFETY REVIEW AND MARKETED DRUG SAFETY AS
EQUAL PRIORITIES AT FDA’S CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (Apr. 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/drugsafety/ucm300946.pdf. PMRs are studies required by
law, whereas PMCs are studies that are not legally required but that sponsors have agreed to
conduct. Prior to the FDAAA, the FDA could require the following studies or clinical trials:
“Postmarketing studies or clinical trials to demonstrate clinical benefit for drugs approved
under the accelerated approval requirements in 21 CFR 314.510 and 21 CFR 601.41; Deferred
pediatric studies (21 CFR 314.55(b) and 601.27(b)), where studies are required under the
Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA); Studies or clinical trials to demonstrate safety and
efficacy in humans that must be conducted at the time of use of products approved under the
Animal Efficacy Rule (21 CFR 314.610(b)(1) and 601.91(b)(1)).” Since the FDAAA,
postmarketing studies can be required to “[a]ssess a known serious risk related to the use of the
drug”, “[a]ssess signals of serious risk related to the use of the drug”, and “[i]dentify an
unexpected serious risk when available data indicate the potential for a serious risk.”
Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Introduction, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Post-marketingPhaseIV
Commitments (last updated Feb. 8, 2012).
32. See CDRH Transparency: Overview of Medical Devices and Their Regulatory Pathways,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedical
ProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHTransparency/ucm203018.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2014)
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FDA-approved parameters constitutes an on-label use, whereas the
33
use of a drug outside those parameters constitutes an off-label use.
Off-label use is common: “for the 3 leading drugs in each of the 15
leading drug classes, off-label use account[s] for approximately 21%
34
of prescriptions.” Moreover, off-label uses may be the norm in some
areas of practice, such as oncology, pain management, and palliative
care, and in some patient populations, such as children, the elderly,
35
and the severely ill. For example, about 80 percent of all drug
prescriptions for children are off-label, and between 80 and 90
36
percent of all drug prescriptions for rare diseases are off-label.
The central problem with off-label use is that that there is an
information deficit. Whereas on-label use is based on scientifically
valid and statistically significant evidence indicating that the potential
benefits of a drug are likely to outweigh the potential risks, off-label
use lacks such information. This is a serious problem because all
approved drugs are potentially dangerous and have a risk of side
effects, and patients should not be exposed to risk without evidence
that a drug is likely to be effective. Unfortunately, the overwhelming

(“The agency does not regulate the practice of medicine—how and which physicians can use a
device.”); see also Promotion of Unapproved Drugs and Medical Devices, Testimony Before the
S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of William B. Schultz,
Deputy Comm’r for Policy, Food & Drug Admin.), available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115098.htm (“The legislative history of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act indicates that Congress did not intend FDA to interfere with the practice of
medicine. Thus, once a drug is approved for marketing, FDA does not generally regulate how,
and for what uses, physicians prescribe that drug. A physician may prescribe a drug for uses or
in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not listed in the FDA-approved
labeling.”).
33. C. Lee Ventola, Off-Label Drug Information: Regulation, Distribution, Evaluation, and
Related Controversies, 34 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 428, 428 (2009); see also Randall S.
Stafford, Off-Label Use of Drugs and Medical Devices: A Review of Policy Implications, 91
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 920, 920 (2012) (“‘Off-label use’ occurs when
the use of a medication or device deviates from what is mentioned in its . . . FDA . . . product
label.”).
34. Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the Role of the FDA,
358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008); see Chris Adams & Alison Young, Prescribing Drugs
“Off Label” Is Routine, but Can Injure, Kill Patients, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPER, Nov. 2, 2003,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2003/11/02/28121/prescribing-drugs-off-label-is.html
(explaining
that prescriptions for off-label use nearly doubled over five years).
35. Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate OffLabel Drug Use, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 656 (2013).
36. James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds: Prescriber and Marketer
Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 324
(2003).
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majority of off-label uses lack scientific support, and thus, off-label
prescribing may place “patients at risk of harm without adequate
38
knowledge of the therapeutic risks and benefits.” It has been
estimated that about “15 percent of all drug uses lack scientific
support for efficacy and more than 70 percent of off-label uses lack
39
significant scientific support.” In 2008, one study estimated that 67
percent of children treated with antipsychotic drugs were prescribed
40
off-label treatments with an “uncertain” evidence base. This is at
odds with patients’ expectation that a drug’s safety and efficacy have
41
been fully evaluated. In fact, a recent poll of the U.S. public found
that about half of respondents believed physicians were allowed to
prescribe only for on-label indications, and about half believed
42
physicians should be prohibited from off-label prescribing. When
off-label uses are not based on significant scientific data, the
principles of evidence-based medicine argue that “intuition,
unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiologic rationale are
43
insufficient grounds for clinical decision making.”
On the other hand, off-label drug use is a vital tool for patient
care. It allows physicians to treat patients for whom off-label drug use
may be the only therapy available, including patients for whom on-

37. See Tewodros Eguale, David L. Buckeridge, Nancy E. Winslade, Andrea Benedetti,
James A. Hanley & Robyn Tamblyn, Drug, Patient, and Physician Characteristics Associated
with Off-Label Prescribing in Primary Care, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED., 781, 788 (2012);
David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall S. Stafford, Off-Label Prescribing Among
Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1026 (2006); see also Stafford,
supra note 33, at 921 (“Off-label use without good evidence is common, particularly with respect
to anticonvulsants (38% of all uses), allergy medications (31%), and psychiatric medications
(29%).”).
38. Rodwin, supra note 35, at 654.
39. Id. at 656 (citing A. Brown, Understanding Pharmaceutical Research Manipulation in
the Context of Accounting Manipulation, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 611, 619 (2013)); Y. Feldman,
R. Gauthier & T. Schuller, Curbing Misconduct in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Insights from
Behavioral Ethics and the Behavioral Approach to Law, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 620, 628 (2013).
40. G. C. Alexander, S. A. Gallagher, A. Mascola, R. M. Moloney & R. S. Stafford,
Increasing Off-Label Use of Antipsychotic Medications in the United States, 1995–2008, 20 J.
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 177, 182 (2011).
41. See Stafford, supra note 33, at 2 (“Among its disadvantages, off-label use undercuts the
public expectation that there has been a full evaluation of product safety and efficacy.”).
42. Harris Interactive, U.S. Adults Ambivalent About the Risks and Benefits of Off-Label
Prescription Drug Use (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/Press
Releases/tabid/446/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1506/ArticleId/986/Default.aspx.
43. Gordon Guyat et al., Introduction: The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine, Users’
Guides to the Medical Literature, 10 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1, 4 (2002).
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label use has failed. Due to resource constraints, it will never be
possible to study every possible drug for every possible off-label use,
but drugs may nevertheless be safe and effective in many off-label
contexts. For example, some drugs have been used widely for a long
time with relatively few reported adverse events and with patients
reporting benefit. Further, not all impressions of off-label use are
based on anecdote; some off-label uses are supported by significant
evidence, including from controlled clinical trials. When high-quality
research on off-label use precedes FDA approval, early physician
45
adoption can improve patient outcomes. Compendia, such as the
American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information, evaluate and
46
disseminate evidence supporting off-label uses. In fact, Medicare
Part D and other drug plans may base the reimbursement of off-label
47
uses on their inclusion in major drug compendia.
Off-label drug use impacts more than individual patient care—it
may also serve as a pathway to innovation. Off-label drug use can
provide valuable data about the effects of the drug for different
conditions and populations, and this data can then be used to inform
48
future clinical practice. In essence, it has the capacity to create a
clinical laboratory. Unfortunately, despite widespread use of off-label
prescribing, patient outcomes are generally not evaluated in a
49
consistent and transparent manner. Also, when drugs are prescribed
50
for off-label uses, healthcare costs may increase. The cost of

44. Stafford, supra note 33, at 921.
45. Id.
46. American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information, AM. SOC’Y OF HEALTH-SYS.
PHARMACISTS, http://www.ashp.org/ahfs (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
47. R. Dresser & J. Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional and
Government Oversight, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 480 (2009). A recent review of Medicareapproved compendia governing reimbursement for off-label oncological uses, however,
reported that the compendia were “lacking in consistency, quality, transparency, and
timeliness.” Id. at 479.
48. Id.
49. Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An
Agenda for Reform, 40 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 515–16 (2012); see also Benjamin Falit, The
Path to Cheaper and Safer Drugs: Revamping the Pharmaceutical Industry in Light of
GlaxoSmithKline’s Settlement, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 179 (2005) (explaining that after
initial FDA approval, “pharmaceutical companies [are] responsible for informing physicians
about the safety of their drugs”).
50. Off-label use is widely thought to increase healthcare costs because it increases
spending on drugs. See Stafford, supra note 33, at 3. Increased spending on drugs may increase
healthcare costs regardless of whether patient outcomes improve. Id. On the other hand, it may
be possible for off-label use to decrease healthcare costs if it is less expensive than an alternate
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prescription drugs is a significant driver of the cost of healthcare in
51
the United States. For example, of the twelve anti-cancer drugs
approved by the FDA in 2012, eleven of them cost over $100,000 a
52
Finally, off-label use disincentivizes companies from
year.
conducting additional clinical research because it allows them to sell
53
their products without seeking FDA approval. Under the current
regulatory regime, manufacturers opt for back-door approaches to
developing off-label revenue streams because of the “enormous
54
amount of time and money” required to seek FDA approval for a
new use.
Pharmaceutical companies have a significant impact on
55
physicians’ off-label prescribing practices. Although companies are
56
prohibited from directly promoting off-label drug use, the FDA

treatment. Off-label use may also decrease costs by improving health outcomes, resulting in
reduced need for future treatment.
51. Ryan Abbott, Treating the Health Care Crisis: Complementary and Alternative Medicine
for PPACA, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 35, 57 (2011).
52. Experts in Chronic Myeloid Leukemia, The Price of Drugs for Chronic Myeloid
Leukemia (CML) is a Reflection of the Unsustainable Prices of Cancer Drugs: From the
Perspective of a Large Group of CML Experts, 121 J. BLOOD 4439, 4439 (2013).
53. See Stafford, supra note 34, at 1427–28.
54. Ventola, supra note 33, at 431; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and
Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225,
237 (2011) (explaining that “[t]hese conditions disincentivize manufacturers from seeking
formal FDA review of all but the most potentially lucrative of off-label uses, and the ones most
likely to be granted approval”).
55. Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?,
283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 373, 373–80 (2000). As David Kessler wrote while he was the
Commissioner of the FDA,
Prescription drug advertisements sometimes distort information in ways that may be
difficult to detect by even the trained observer. Unless the individual physician is an
expert in the particular disease or therapeutic class linked to the drug advertisement,
it is unlikely he or she will engage in a critical analysis of the evidence supporting
every new drug claim . . . .
David A. Kessler, Addressing the Problem of Misleading Advertising, 116 ANNALS INTERN.
MED. 950, 950 (June 1, 1992).
56. Ventola, supra note 33, at 428. Within the FDA, the Office of Prescription Drug
Promotion (OPDP) evaluates proposed and effective drug and device promotions—advising
sponsors who submit draft materials as well as identifying violations. The Office of Prescription
Drug Promotion (OPDP), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm090142.htm. The OPDP is
charged with addressing the promotion of off-label drug use, but does not typically regulate
nonpromotional activities and events, the dissemination of scientific material, or the exchange
of information, unless it appears they are sponsor-backed. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3)(i)
(2014). The OPDP relies heavily on voluntary submissions by pharmaceutical companies,
supplemented by limited monitoring and surveillance. Id. Violations of marketing regulations
can result in steep fines and penalties. Id.
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allows them to give physicians information about off-label drug uses
57
from journal articles and reference publications. This primarily
occurs during face-to-face sales and promotional activities, referred to
58
as “detailing.” As the Supreme Court noted in IMS v. Sorrell,
“[p]harmaceutical manufacturers promote their drugs to doctors
through a process called ‘detailing.’ . . . Detailers bring . . . medical
studies that explain the ‘details’ and potential advantages of various
prescription drugs. Interested physicians listen, ask questions, and
59
receive follow-up data.” Companies spend a substantial amount on
detailing and similar marketing activities—more than $27 billion in
60
2012. Of that amount, about $24 billion was spent on advertising to
physicians and $3 billion was spent on direct marketing to consumers
61
(primarily on television advertisements). Moreover, evidence
suggests that pharmaceutical companies often violate prohibitions on
62
off-label promotion.
Private and public insurers also have a significant influence on
off-label use. Patients who cannot independently cover the cost of
prescription medicines will not be able to engage in off-label use
without insurance-cost sharing. Insurers also have a financial
incentive to limit off-label use to the extent they believe it will
63
increase overall costs. Private insurers have attempted to restrict
prescribing practices by arguing that such prescriptions are not
64
“medically necessary,” but this tactic has met with limited success.
57. The agency suggests that companies follow Good Reprint Practices. U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL
ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW
USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009),
www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm.
58. CEGEDIM STRATEGIC DATA, 2012 U.S. Pharmaceutical Company Promotion Spending
(2013), http://www.skainfo.com/health_care_market_reports/2012_promotional_spending.pdf.
59. IMS v. Sorrell, 132 S. Ct. 2653, 2656–57 (2011) (citations omitted). “Similar efforts to
promote the use of generic pharmaceuticals are sometimes referred to as ‘counter-detailing.’”
Id. at 2661.
60. See CEGEDIM STRATEGIC DATA, supra note 58, at 2.
61. Id.
62. Aaron S. Kesselheim, David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, Whistle-Blowers’
Experiences in Fraud Litigation against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1832, 1833 tbl. 1 (2010); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Shifting
Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1557, 1566 (2009).
63. Ryan Abbott & Carl Stevens, Redefining Medical Necessity: A Consumer Driven
Solution to the U.S. Health Care Crisis, 32 LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
64. Id.; see Ventola, supra note 33, at 435 (detailing insurers’ arguments against off-label
prescribing). Many courts have adopted a contra preferentem approach in challenges to insurers’
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The primary public insurer, CMS, generally does not reimburse for
off-label uses in the Medicare/Medicaid context, except for off-label
65
uses that are recognized as effective in various compendia. However,
a 2009 survey of third-party payers administering Medicare/Medicaid
drug benefits found vast discrepancies in reimbursement policies for
66
off-label use. One-quarter of administrators reported that they
simply did not reimburse off-label prescriptions, while 15 percent
reported that they were unable to utilize effective policies covering
67
off-label use because it was too difficult for them to detect. Among
administrators reimbursing for off-label prescriptions, over half had
restrictions requiring some combination of insurer preauthorization,
limiting reimbursement to certain indications, requiring therapeutic
alternatives prior to off-label use, limiting quantities of off-label
68
prescriptions, and requiring enhanced beneficiary cost sharing.
Beyond the FDA, industry, and insurers, there are only a few
significant influences on off-label prescribing. States regulate
prescribing only insofar as to prevent fraud, avert overdose, and set
69
practices for state benefits programs. Healthcare institutions, such as
attempts to limit off-label or experimental use. Under this approach, off-label uses are covered
unless expressly and clearly excluded by the insurance contract. In Lubeznik v. HealthChicago,
644 N.E.2d 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), a patient with advanced ovarian cancer obtained an
injunction requiring her insurance company to pre-certify her for a debatably experimental
treatment. Lubeznik v. HealthChicago, 644 N.E.2d 777, 778, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). The
primary source of data used to assess the procedure was the treating physician, who claimed to
have performed twenty-one such procedures with a 75 percent success rate. Id. at 779. “In 1993,
a California jury awarded $89 million in damages against an insurer that had refused to cover
ABTM, including $77 million in punitive damages.” BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 643 (7th ed. 2013). Eventually, thirty thousand women
received the same treatment at a cost of $3 billion. Id. at 644. Fewer than ten years after Bonnie
Lubeznik’s landmark case against the insurer was decided in her favor, studies proved the
treatment had no beneficial effects. Id.
65. See Compendia for Determination of Medically-Accepted Indications for Off-Label
Uses of Drugs and Biologicals in an Anti-Cancer Chemotherapeutic Regimen, 42 C.F.R.
§ 414.930 (2014). Compendia summarize and evaluate the evidence supporting off-label uses.
Dresser & Frader, supra note 47, at 479. However, these evaluations are not as rigorous as FDA
review. Id. Compendia have been criticized as lacking in consistency, quality, transparency, and
timeliness. Katherine Tillman, Brijet Burton, Louis B. Jacques & Steve E. Phurrough,
Compendia and Anticancer Therapy Under Medicare, 150 ANNALS INTERN. MED., 348, 348–49
(2009).
66. J. Cohen, A. Wilson & L. Faden, Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
391, 394 (2009).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Law: Prescription Limits,
http://www.cdc.gov/HomeandRecreationalSafety/Poisoning/laws/rx_limits.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2014). There are exceptions—for example, states such as Ohio and Oklahoma have
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Kaiser and the Veteran’s Administration, may have restrictions or
internal protocols regarding off-label use, but these apply only
internally. Medical associations may make recommendations
regarding best practices or clinical guidelines, but otherwise do not
censor or participate in assessing prescribing habits, especially on the
level of individual patients. Finally, tort liability acts as a constraint
on physicians’ prescribing practices to the extent that off-label
prescribing can generate malpractice liability if it fails to adhere to
70
accepted standards of care.
C. The FDA’s Postmarket Regulation
The FDA has various tools for postmarket regulation: reporting
requirements, agency surveillance, warnings, and postmarket trial
requirements for pharmaceutical companies. Product sponsors are
required to submit postmarket reports of all serious and unexpected
adverse reactions to the FDA’s Adverse Events Reporting System
71
72
(AERS) within fifteen days of becoming aware of the event.
Physicians and patients are not required to report adverse events, but
73
may report adverse reactions voluntarily to the FDA’s MedWatch
reporting system, the data from which is incorporated in the AERS
74
database. Pharmaceutical companies are also required to report the
results of any postmarket clinical trials and findings from their own
75
and others’ research and publications.
The FDA’s CDER and Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology
analyze data submitted by manufacturers, physicians, and patients
after a drug goes on the market. Agency scientists examine reported
required (or have attempted to require) that mifespristone, or abortifacients generally, be used
on-label. Irin Carmon, Court Blocks Arizona Abortion Restrictions, MSNBC (June 3, 2014, 3:55
PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/court-blocks-arizona-abortion-restrictions.
70. S.R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 194 (1999).
71. Drug Approvals and Databases: Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm135151.htm (last updated
Sept. 17, 2014). For additional information about AERS, see Adverse Event Reporting System
(FAERS) (formerly AERS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm
(last updated Sept. 8, 2014) (discussing problems with data in the FAERS system).
72. Records and Reports Concerning Adverse Drug Experiences on Marketed Prescription
Drugs for Human Use Without Approved New Drug Applications, 21 C.F.R. § 310.305 (2014).
73. MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch (last updated Oct. 25, 2014).
74. THAUL, supra note 13, at 11.
75. Id. at 12; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (2012) (describing records and reporting requirements).
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data to determine which adverse reactions are related to the drug.
Although the present system is largely passive, relying on third-party
reports submitted to the agency, the FDA “has started to develop an
infrastructure that uses data from public and private sources . . . and
77
expands its information base.” Through the new, more active
surveillance system, the Sentinel Initiative, the FDA aims to “better
detect safety signals, analyze data to understand them, and identify
78
strategies to fix the problem.” The Sentinel Initiative now has the
capacity to monitor adverse events in over one hundred million U.S.
residents by actively querying diverse automated healthcare-data
holders—including electronic medical-record systems, insurance79
claims databases, and registries.
The FDA can mandate drug-label changes to warn physicians
and patients when the agency becomes aware of new safety
80
information that it determines should be included in the labeling.
Such changes range from requiring pharmaceutical companies to
update warnings and precautions, to imposing a black-box warning.
Although boxed warnings may be required at the time of FDA
approval, they are more commonly added after a drug has been
81
approved and the FDA has received reports of adverse effects.

76. THAUL, supra note 13, at 12.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id.; see Sentinel Initiative—Transforming How We Monitor Product Safety: FDA’s
Sentinel Initiative—Ongoing Projects, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/ucm203500.htm (last updated July 11, 2012) (describing the
“scientific operations needed for the Sentinel Initiative”); FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/default.htm (last updated
Oct. 22, 2014) (providing an overview of the Sentinel Initiative); Sentinel Initiative—
Transforming How We Monitor Product Safety: Sentinel Initiative: A National Strategy for
Monitoring Medical Product Safety, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda
.gov/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/ucm089474.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2010) (detailing the
Sentinel Initiative); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, SENTINEL INITIATIVE, http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/UCM124701.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (same).
79. See sources cited supra note 78.
80. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (2012); see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: SAFETY LABELING CHANGES—IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505(O)(4) OF THE
FD&C ACT (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM250783.pdf (discussing the FDA’s thoughts on how the
regulation and the statutory provision relate to one another in the safety-labeling-changes
guidance).
81. NORMAN S. MARKS & KAREN WEISS, BOXED WARNINGS AND OTHER FDA
COMMUNICATION TOOLS 259 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/
MedWatch/UCM201430.pdf.
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In 2007, Congress substantially expanded the FDA’s ability to
require postmarket studies under the Food and Drug Administration
82
Amendments Act (FDAAA). The agency can now demand PMRs
to assess a known serious risk, to assess signals of a serious risk, or to
83
identify an unexpected serious risk. After drug approval, the agency
84
needs new safety information to demand a PMR. Congress’s passage
of the FDAAA was a direct and powerful response to reported
“inadequacies in drug companies’ fulfillment of . . . postmarketing
studies and weaknesses in FDA’s regulatory authority to enforce
85
these commitments.” As the breadth of the statutory language
suggests, the FDAAA “envisions heavy use, during the postmarket
period, of large observational studies that rely on interoperable
86
health data networks.” Indeed, this authorization represented the
87
most transformative amendment to the FDCA in the last fifty years.
It has been characterized as “a sweeping overhaul of . . . both the
88
FDCA and the Public Health Service Act” and “a profound change
89
in law.” Before the FDAAA, the FDA could only request that
90
pharmaceutical companies conduct postmarket testing.
As a final step, the FDA has the authority to revoke marketing
authorization and remove a drug from the market. Four percent of
91
approved drugs are eventually removed.

82. Jill Wechsler, FDAAA Empowers FDA To Have Greater Control over Drug Safety,
FORMULARY WATCH (Dec. 1, 2007), http://formularyjournal.modernmedicine.com/formularyjournal/news/clinical/clinical-pharmacology/fdaaa-empowers-fda-have-greater-control-over-d.
83. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823, § 901(a) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
84. Id.
85. Kevin Fain, Matthew Daubresse & G. Caleb Alexander, The Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act and Postmarketing Commitments, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 202,
202 (2013) (citing a 2006 report by the Office of Inspector General).
86. Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 420–21 (2010).
87. See id. at 422–23 (discussing the history of amendments to the FDCA and
characterizing the FDAAA as “the most momentous shift in drug regulation in half a century”).
88. David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts To
Preempt Failure-To-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L. J. 461, 467 (2008).
89. Evans, supra note 86, at 422.
90. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ADVANCES IN FDA’S SAFETY PROGRAM FOR
MARKETED DRUGS: ESTABLISHING PREMARKET SAFETY REVIEW AND MARKETED DRUG
SAFETY AS EQUAL PRIORITIES AT FDA’S CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH
(2012), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/drugsafety/ucm300946.pdf.
91. Abbott, supra note 4, at 228 n.9.
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D. Problems with FDA Postmarket Regulation
Evidence suggests that the FDA is not yet optimally regulating
off-label and postmarket drug use despite its expanded statutory
92
mandate. Notwithstanding expectations that the FDA would use its
enhanced regulatory power under the FDAAA to more aggressively
police postmarket drug use, the agency has demonstrated reluctance
to realize the ambitious statutory mandate envisioned by Congress.
The FDA has required relatively few postmarket studies and has
allowed manufacturers to drag their feet in responding to the requests
93
that the FDA has submitted. For example, a 2014 study found that
the FDA had required eighty-five PMCs for the twenty therapeutic
drugs approved in 2008, but that only twenty-six had been fulfilled,
94
and only eight had been submitted for agency review. In addition, a
2013 report by the Office of the Inspector General concluded that the
agency had failed to consistently enforce REMS requiring ETASU.
95
The FDA approved 199 REMS between 2008 and 2011. However,
FDA review memoranda of forty-nine recent sponsor assessments of

92. “Congress has enacted legislation to expand the FDA’s authority with the intent of
protecting the public health but often without appropriating the necessary resources.” Raymond
L. Woosley, One Hundred Years of Drug Regulation: Where Do We Go from Here?, 53
ANNUAL REV. PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 255, 265 (2013). That was in the best of times.
The federal shutdown in October 2013 “left US public health systems reeling and exposed their
vulnerability to national politics.” Bridget M. Kuehn, Shutdown Underscored Vulnerability of
US Public Health and Biomedical Research to Political Wrangling, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1907
(2013). About half of the FDA’s staff were furloughed. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., CONTINGENCY STAFFING PLAN FOR OPERATIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF ENACTED
ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS (2013), http://www.hhs.gov/budget/fy2014/fy2014contingency_
staffing_plan-rev6.pdf.
93. See Howard Bauchner & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Editorial, Restoring Confidence in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 607, 608 (2013) (explaining that “an important
proportion of these [postmarket] studies are not completed in a timely fashion” and lamenting
that “[w]ithout rigorous postmarketing studies, the true risk and safety profile of a drug in the
‘real-world’ patient population is not defined”); Fain et al., supra note 85, at 202–03 (analyzing
the FDA’s use of postmarket studies from 2007 and 2011 and concluding that this “analysis
reinforces continued concerns about the status of prescription drug postmarketing studies in the
United States”).
94. Thomas J. Moore & Curt D. Furberg, Development Times, Clinical Testing, Postmarket
Follow-up, and Safety Risks for the New Drugs Approved by the US Food and Drug
Administration: The Class of 2008, 174 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 90, 90 (2014).
(“None of the trials conducted prior to approval assessed the efficacy of the drug beyond 24
weeks, including for those medications intended for open ended use.”).
95. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA LACKS
COMPREHENSIVE DATA TO DETERMINE WHETHER RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION
STRATEGIES IMPROVE DRUG SAFETY, No. OEI-04-11-00510, at 11 (2013).
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REMS showed that only seven met all requirements. Of the sponsor
assessments, “nearly half . . . did not include all information requested
97
in FDA assessment plans,” and ten were late.
Although current labeling practices, including boxed warnings,
have been shown in some studies to decrease prescriptions and sales
98
of certain drugs, these warnings have been widely criticized as
99
100
ineffective and arbitrary. Indeed, one study found that more than
40 percent of ambulatory-care patients received at least one
potentially relevant black-box warning medication in a thirty-month
period, and that compliance with black-box warnings was “highly
101
variable.” Another observational study of fifty-one outpatient
practices using an electronic health record looked at a total of 324,548
patients and found that 33,778 of them (10.4 percent) received a
medication with a black-box warning. In 7 percent of those cases, the
102
prescribing physician violated the black-box warning. Despite the
specificity of their labeling requirements, black-box warnings have
arguably failed to prevent the potentially dangerous drug uses they
were designed to target. Instead, they have engendered confusion and
controversy among prescribers. This warning system is at once too
inflexible in demanding a binary distinction between one small set of

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., E. Ray Dorsey, Sarah A. Gallagher, Rena M. Conti & G. Caleb Alexander,
Impact of FDA Black Box Advisory on Antipsychotic Medication Use, 170 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 96, 100 (2010) (finding that the FDA’s April 2005 advisory and black-box
warning requirements concerning the increased risk of mortality associated with the use of
certain antipsychotics among elderly patients “was associated with a decrease in the use of the
medications,” and that this decline lasted more than two years).
99. See, e.g., Anita K. Wagner, K. Arnold Chan, Inna Dashevsky, Marsha A. Raebel, Susan
E. Andrade, Jennifer Elston Lafata, Robert L. Davis, Jerry H. Gurwitze, Stephen B. Soumerai
& Richard Platt, FDA Drug Prescribing Warnings: Is the Black Box Half Empty or Half Full?,
15 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOL. & DRUG SAFETY 369, 370–74 (2006) (characterizing black-box
warnings’ “effectiveness as a risk communication tool” as “debatable” and identifying the “need
for better methods of ensuring the safe use of medications that are considered to carry serious
risks”).
100. See, e.g., Halloran & Barash, supra note 24, at 424 (“The nonspecific and arguably
unscientific methods by which a drug receives a [black-box warning], in addition to biases of
committee members making critical decisions regarding the fate of dangerous drugs, have cast
doubt on the quality of the system.”); see generally Bryan A. Liang, Editorial, FDA Use of the
Black Box Warning: Time for Reevaluation as a Safety Tool, 14 J. CLINICAL ANESTHESIA 561
(2003) (lamenting the FDA’s failure to provide specific guidance regarding the conditions under
which black-box warnings may be required).
101. Wagner et al., supra note 99, at 374.
102. Lasser et al., supra note 23, at 340.
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drug uses and all others and too feeble in failing to impose significant
costs on those who ignore it.
II. DESIGNING AN EVOLUTIONARY, EVIDENCE-BASED
EXTRAPOLATION REGULATION
A. Improved Data Collection
The starting point for our proposal to is to improve reporting of
off-label drug use in the United States. Although we are by no means
the first to identify the problems with our current reporting regime in
103
we believe that the benefits of integrating and
this area,
consolidating existing information regarding off-label use are greater
today than ever before and, indeed, may be achieved through a
104
combination of several modest tweaks to existing policies.
Specifically, we believe that five concrete and politically achievable
policy changes would dramatically improve the quality and quantity
of information available regarding off-label use: (1) requiring greater
manufacturer reporting of off-label use, (2) including diagnostic codes
in adverse event reporting, (3) including diagnostic codes in
Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement requests, (4) requiring diagnostic
use at the point of prescription for a subset of FDA-designated drugs,
and (5) disseminating publicly the de-identified collected data.
1. Manufacturer Reporting of Off-Label Use.
First, we
recommend that manufacturers be required to provide the FDA with

103. See, e.g., Stafford, supra note 34, at 1427–29 (identifying the absence of consistent,
detailed reporting on off-label drug use); Surrey M. Walton, Glen T. Shumock, Ky-Van Lee, G.
Caleb Alexander, David Meltzer & Randall S. Stafford, Prioritizing Future Research on OffLabel Prescribing: Results of a Quantitative Evaluation, 28 PHARMACOTHERAPY 1443, 1450
(2008) (“Policy surrounding data collection, coding, and the prescription mechanism need to be
updated, particularly in the current environment where many health systems are moving to
electronic health records and electronic prescribing.”).
104. When Congress amended the FDA’s statutory mandate in 2007, the FDA expressed a
keen awareness of the potential benefits from improving communication and enhancing its datacollection systems. The FDA explained, for example, that “[i]mproving our communication and
information flows will further strengthen the effectiveness of the drug safety system.” U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY – PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC: FDA’S RESPONSE TO THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE’S 2006 REPORT 12
(2007). Our proposal takes the FDA at its word and suggests that this objective may be achieved
through a combination of relatively minor changes in the reporting requirements of various
actors in the off-label-drug market.

ABBOTT AYRES IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/17/2014 8:34 PM

400

[Vol. 64:377

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
105

annual reports on the off-label uses of their drugs. These reports
would provide a rough breakdown of each approved drug’s annual
sales by diagnostic code, thus allowing the FDA to identify the
diagnoses for which each of its approved drugs was being used in the
United States. This type of reporting requirement may seem onerous
at first blush but, in fact, would do little more than require
manufacturers to disclose the information they already have—indeed,
the same information that allows them to turn handsome profits from
106
off-label use. Manufacturers acquire this information from a variety
of sources; for example, they purchase data on off-label use from
107
companies that aggregate data on physicians’ prescribing practices.
This data represents a vital component of the detailing process, as it is
108
used to refine marketing tactics and to increase sales.
Manufacturers are also, as many commentators have pointed
out, intimately involved in the development of peer-reviewed
109
research documenting the off-label uses of their drugs. To cite only
105. This information is not currently required of manufacturers, which are required to
submit reports only on adverse events. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2014).
106. As the FDA has explained,
[s]cientific or medical departments within drug or medical device firms often maintain
a large body of information about their products. This information typically includes
data and other information consistent with the approved or cleared indications or
conditions of use for their products, but may also include off-label information for
their products.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED REQUESTS FOR OFF-LABEL INFORMATION ABOUT
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES (Dec. 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM285145.pdf.
107. Although physicians are not required to detail the diagnostic codes of off-label
treatments, they often choose to do so, and commentators have noted that the cost of providing
diagnostic codes has decreased substantially in recent years. See, e.g., Walton et al., supra note
103, at 1450 (explaining that although “physicians are not required to document the indication
for which a drug is prescribed . . . [d]ocumentation of a diagnosis for each drug prescribed is
likely to be increasingly useful and feasible [and] at the same time could reduce medication
errors”).
108. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2657 (2011).
109. See, e.g., Ventola, supra note 33, at 430 (discussing manufacturers’ ability to “conduct
the clinical trials that are necessary to gain regulatory approval and then disseminate these data
through marketing, advertising, and publication in the medical literature”). The involvement of
manufacturers in developing the literature supporting the efficacy of certain off-label uses has
only increased, according to several commentators, since the FDA began allowing
manufacturers to distribute reprints of this literature in 2009. See, e.g., Kesselheim, supra note
54, at 256 (discussing the ability of manufacturers to “pass out medical journal article reprints
that discuss off-label uses without the off-label use being the subject of an [FDA
investigation]”); Mello et al., supra note 62, at 1559 (discussing manufacturers’ historical ability
to distribute peer-reviewed literature on off-label uses and noting the effects of the FDA’s 2009
guidance on this practice).
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a few of the most public (and controversial) examples, the
manufacturer of one hemostatic agent approved for the treatment of
hemophilia “played a substantial role in sponsoring, designing,
directing, analyzing, and publishing much of the . . . evidence”
110
supporting the drug’s off-label use;
Eli Lilly sponsored and
developed a series of articles appearing in publications such as the
New England Journal of Medicine regarding the off-label use of its
111
drug, recombinant human activated protein C (Xigris);
and
Allergan, the manufacturer of Botox, has recently pointed to studies
demonstrating the efficacy of off-label uses of its drug—uses that now
112
support nearly half of the drug’s sales. In examples such as these,
manufacturers’ knowledge of off-label uses has supported a
significant portion—and in some cases a majority—of their drugs’
sales, yet manufacturers have no obligation to share this knowledge
113
with the FDA. Although third-party researchers have been able to
provide a rough picture of off-label use by relying on various
114
datasets, the manufacturers themselves remain free to withhold the
information that frequently winds up printed in ghost-written, peerreviewed articles and that ultimately supports a significant source of
115
their revenue. Requiring manufacturers to provide the FDA with

110. Veronica Yank et al., Systematic Review: Benefits and Harms of In-Hospital Use of
Recombinant Factor VIIa for Off-Label Indications, 154 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 529, 537 (2011).
111. See ROSS MCKINNEY, AMY P. ABERNETHY, DAVID B. MATCHAR & JANE L.
WHEELER, POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PRODUCTION OF DRUG COMPENDIA 10
(2009).
112. See Jef Feeley & Phil Milford, Allergan Holders Can Proceed with Botox Suit, Judge
Rules, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0611/allergan-holders-can-proceed-with-botox-suit-judge-rules-1-.html.
113. See, e.g., Kesselheim, supra note 54, at 235–36 (explaining that nearly 75 percent of one
oncology drug’s use was off-label); Tracy Staton, Allergan Inks $600M Off-Label Settlement,
FIERCEPHARMA (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/allergan-inks-600m-labelsettlement/2010-09-02 (providing examples of manufacturers prioritizing off-label drug use).
114. See, e.g., Radley et al., supra note 37, at 1025 (estimating the prevalence of off-label
prescriptions by using the 2001 National Disease and Therapeutic Index, which the authors
characterize as “a nationally representative survey of office-based physicians”); see also Walton
et al., supra note 103, at 1445 (discussing researchers’ ability to “quantif[y] the volume of offlabel uses for a specific drug by using the National Disease and Therapeutic Index”); S.M.
Walton, W.L. Galanter & D. Sarne, A Trial of Inpatient Indication Based Prescribing During
Computerized Order Entry with Medications Commonly Used Off-Label, 2 APPLIED CLINICAL
INFO. 94 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3631908 (conducting
a clinical study to estimate the magnitude of off-label use of certain drugs).
115. Sergio Sismondo, Ghosts in the Machine: Publication Planning in the Medical Sciences,
39 SOC. STUD. SCI. 171, 198 (2009); Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the
Medical Literature Is Shaped Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLOS
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data on off-label use on an annual basis would also mitigate many of
the perverse incentives to engage in the type of “loopholing”
116
behavior discussed above.
To be sure, annual reporting of off-label uses would not be
without its own administrative costs. But these costs should not be
overstated, particularly in light of the resources manufacturers
already devote to off-label research and sales. The costs imposed by
our proposed reporting requirement, therefore, are not search costs—
that is, the manufacturer need provide only information that is
already within its knowledge or that would be easily ascertainable.
Instead, the costs are simply those of providing this information to a
different audience: regulators, rather than potential customers.
In the spirit of the regulations we propose and in recognition of
the potentially imperfect information available to manufacturers, the
FDA could grant the manufacturers the kind of reporting flexibility
117
that is apparent in other areas of FDA regulation. The FDA could
require manufacturers to use reasonable diligence to become
informed and to report what they know. Finally, because
manufacturers already do report to the FDA at regular intervals,
118
including on an annual basis, compliance with our proposal is highly
unlikely to impose unreasonable or excessive costs on these
businesses. Our proposal would thus avoid the perverse incentives
toward antitransparency that currently prevail in manufacturers’ offlabel practices and would impose few incremental costs on
manufacturers.

MEDICINE 1429, 1433 (2007); see Sergio Sismondo, Key Opinion Leaders, the Corruption of
Medical Knowledge, and the Sunshine Act, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 1, 27 (2013).
116. See Kesselheim, supra note 54, at 228 (discussing manufacturers’ use of improper offlabel promotions). Annual reports could also require disclosure of a pharmaceutical company’s
sponsorship of research and publications.
117. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: POSTMARKETING ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING FOR
NONPRESCRIPTION HUMAN DRUG PRODUCTS MARKETED WITHOUT AN APPROVED
APPLICATION 5, 7 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/
ucm171672.pdf (discussing manufacturers’ obligation to disclose adverse events within fifteen
days and emphasizing that, given the urgency of adverse events and the limited timeframe to file
a report, a manufacturer’s efforts to provide adequate information need only be “reasonable”).
A similar “reasonableness” standard would be appropriate here, and, as discussed above, such a
standard would have clear precedents in FDA regulations.
118. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CMC POSTAPPROVAL MANUFACTURING CHANGES REPORTABLE
IN ANNUAL REPORTS 1–5 (2014) (discussing manufacturers’ annual-reporting requirements
under other FDA regulations).
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2. Enhanced Reporting of Adverse Events. The second element
of our proposal to improve reporting calls for the reporting of
diagnostic codes in AERS. Here, we suggest two straightforward
changes to FDA policy in this area: allowing physicians to include
diagnostic codes in their reporting of adverse events and imposing a
duty of inquiry on manufacturers to ascertain the diagnostic codes of
prescriptions in their reports. Data on patient diagnostic codes is
particularly valuable because it can be used in data-mining strategies
on large data sets to detect and analyze associations between off-label
119
uses, diagnostic codes, and adverse events. In 2011, the FDA
120
received a total of 874,116 reports of adverse events.
Under the current AERS regime, physicians do not report
diagnostic codes of adverse events—even if they would be inclined to
121
do so. The reality, however, is that patients who experience adverse
drug events usually have diagnostic codes associated with their
indication for taking the drug (as well as for their comorbidities and
122
the adverse event itself). Similarly, in the vaccination context,
researchers have demonstrated the effectiveness of including
diagnostic codes in post-vaccination adverse events, even though such
reporting entails the additional burden of following up with patients
123
for a period following vaccination. Physicians’ use of diagnostic
codes in reporting adverse events is neither universal nor perfect, but
it ought to be an option available to doctors who do report adverse
events to the FDA—particularly since many of them already

119. Abbott, supra note 4, at 239.
120. FDA Adverse Events Reporting System (FAERS): Reports Received and Reports
Entered into FAERS by Year, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/ucm070434.htm
(last updated Aug. 6, 2013).
121. See Paul Hougland, Jonathan Nebeker, Steve Pickard, Mark Van Tuinen, Carol
Masheter, Susan Elder, Scott Williams & Wu Xu, Using ICD-9-CM Codes in Hospital Claims
Data to Detect Adverse Events in Patient Safety Surveillance, ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY:
NEW DIRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 12–15 (2008), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK43647/pdf/advances-hougland_26.pdf.
122. See id. at 2 (“Virtually all inpatient discharges are assigned International Classification
of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes.”). As Paul Hougland and
his colleagues have proposed, “[i]n the case of an adverse drug event (ADE), a diagnosis code
would be used to indicate the patient’s general diagnosis . . . while the E-code would indicate the
drug class thought responsible for these symptoms.” Id.
123. See ROSS LAZARUS, HARVARD PILGRIM HEALTH CARE, INC., ELECTRONIC SUPPORT
SYSTEM FOR PUBLIC HEALTH – VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEM (2010),
http://healthit.ahrq.gov/ahrq-funded-projects/electronic-support-public-health-vaccine-adverseevent-reporting-system/activity/2010 (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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document these diagnostic codes for other purposes. Thus, under our
proposal, physicians would have the ability to provide diagnostic
codes in reporting adverse events, although they would not be
required to do so. Requiring physicians to report diagnostic codes
might burden physicians and discourage them from voluntarily
submitting adverse events.
Manufacturers, in contrast, would have a duty of reasonable
inquiry to determine the diagnostic code for the original prescription
that gave rise to the adverse event. This requirement would impose
minimal incremental burdens on manufacturers for at least three
reasons. First, as discussed above, physicians often document the
diagnostic codes of adverse events and also often notify
manufacturers of the event; under our proposal, manufacturers could
simply request that physicians relay the information that may well be
in their possession already. Second, the FDA already requires
manufacturers to provide a basic diagnosis, or something close to it,
in reporting the adverse event. Under FDA regulations, “a serious
adverse event should, at a minimum, be described in terms of signs
(including abnormal laboratory findings), symptoms, or disease
124
diagnosis for purposes of reporting.”
Indeed, the FDA
“encourage[s], as appropriate, attachment of the following: (1)
hospital discharge summaries, (2) autopsy reports, (3) relevant
laboratory data, and (4) other critical clinical data” in manufacturers’
125
adverse event reports. Finally, a duty of reasonable inquiry to
determine the diagnostic code is consistent with manufacturers’
general obligations to investigate the facts of adverse events, which
require manufacturers to follow up with medical personnel and
victims to ascertain details that may not have been available at the
126
time the incident was first reported. Manufacturers would not be
punished if physicians or hospitals refused to provide the diagnostic
information, but they would have to maintain a system to ask the
question (and to record and report the answer). Thus, by voluntarily
collecting diagnostic codes from doctors and imposing a duty of
inquiry on manufacturers, the FDA would gain a powerful tool in

124. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 117, at 6.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., id. at 8 (explaining that “[i]f a report received by the responsible person refers
to groups of unknown size, such as ‘some’ or ‘a few’ college students [who] got anaphylaxis, the
responsible person should follow up to find out the number and then submit a separate report to
FDA for each identifiable patient”).
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gathering information regarding off-label drug use while imposing
very few additional costs on physicians and manufacturers.
3. Medicare/Medicaid Reimbursement Requests. With the third
element of our enhanced reporting proposal, we join other scholars in
calling for the inclusion of diagnostic codes in all Medicare/Medicaid
reimbursement requests. Currently, CMS requires diagnostic codes
127
only under Medicare Part B. As Jennifer Herbst has explained, the
current Medicare/Medicaid system lacks a “single database within the
federal healthcare system in which a patient’s outpatient prescription
128
drug use can be cross-referenced with his medical diagnoses.” This
results in a suboptimal use of finite healthcare resources, as CMS pays
for prescriptions not approved under the statutory language of
129
Medicare Part D and Medicaid, as well as in a lost opportunity to
seize informational advantages and to fulfill the Obama
administration’s goal of improving the storage of electronic medical
130
records. One solution, which Professor Herbst has persuasively put
forth and which we support, is to “[m]ake patient diagnosis codes a
necessary condition for payment of outpatient prescription drugs by
127. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL,
ch. 15, § 50.4.1, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Manuals/downloads/bp102c15.pdf (last visited Nov. 5,
2014) (“Use of the drug or biological must be safe and effective and otherwise reasonable and
necessary. . . . Drugs or biologicals approved for marketing by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) are considered safe and effective for purposes of this requirement when
used for indications specified on the labeling.”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, ch. 3, § 20, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/
downloads/clm104c07.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2014); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, ch. 17, § 80.1.3, http://www.cms.gov/
Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/clm104c17.pdf (last visited Nov. 5,
2014) (“A cancer diagnosis code must be reported when billing for [oral cancer drugs using]
these HCPCS [Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System] codes. If there is no cancer
diagnosis the claim is denied.”).
128. Jennifer L. Herbst, How Medicare Part D, Medicaid, Electronic Prescribing and ICD-10
Could Improve Public Health (But Only If CMS Lets Them), 24 HEALTH MATRIX 209, 217
(2014).
129. Professor Herbst, for example, supports this finding by quoting a recent HHS report’s
finding that “50 percent of Medicare Part D claims [reviewed] were erroneous because the
claimed drugs were not provided for medically accepted indications.” Id. at 218 (quoting U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENSURING THAT MEDICARE
PART D REIMBURSEMENT IS LIMITED TO DRUGS PROVIDED FOR MEDICALLY ACCEPTED
INDICATIONS 6 (2011)).
130. Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act, passed as a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
healthcare professionals receive subsidies for transitioning to electronic medical records. See
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300jj-11–300jj-51, §§ 17901–17940 (2012)).
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Medicare Part D and Medicaid.” For our purposes, the key benefit
of this requirement would be an informational one: with this single
step, we would gain the ability to link off-label Medicare/Medicaid
prescriptions to those in other areas and thus be able to provide a
more complete picture of the evolving (and untested) use of certain
drugs. This would result in a very robust dataset, as CMS covers
132
about one hundred million U.S. residents. Not only would this have
the additional benefit of potentially saving CMS billions of dollars,
but it would also have a substantial impact on the private-insurance
market because many private payers follow CMS coverage and
133
reimbursement policies.
We diverge from other scholars, including Professor Herbst, in
proposing that Medicare/Medicaid reimbursements should mandate
diagnostic codes. Professor Herbst, for example, has stopped short of
giving her proposal the teeth we recommend because, if healthcare
professionals could be denied reimbursement for failing to provide
diagnostic codes, they “may decide to tailor their diagnostic coding
practices for payment (and thus, effective treatment) purposes rather
134
than reflecting their patients’ actual diagnoses.” Because this
outcome, in Professor Herbst’s view, would likely result in fraudulent
prescriptions and risk patient safety, we should continue reimbursing
prescribers and physicians who fail to include diagnostic codes in their
135
reimbursement requests.
We disagree. First, we believe that the risks Professor Herbst
identifies are overstated. Because Medicare/Medicaid patients make
up such a substantial portion of certain healthcare markets, including
the majority of many prescribers’ customer bases and the majority of
users of certain drugs, we believe that the professionals in these
markets are far more likely to comply with providing diagnostic

131. Herbst, supra note 128, at 211.
132. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov (last visited Nov. 5,
2014).
133. Demetrios L. Kouzoukas, Anna D. Kraus & Katherine Sauser, From Research to
Revenue: Coverage and Reimbursement for Life Sciences Products—Coverage and
Reimbursement
Recommendations
from
the
MEDCAC,
BLOOMBERG
LAW,
http://bna.com/from-research-to-revenue (Aug. 24, 2011); see also, e.g., ZACKS EQUITY
RESEARCH, Reimbursement Decision for BSX’ Alair, ZACKS, (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www
.zacks.com/stock/news/71644/Reimbursement-Decision-for-BSX-Alair (noting that a positive
reimbursement decision from CMS is expected to encourage private insurers to provide
reimbursement).
134. Herbst, supra note 128, at 218.
135. Id.
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codes—and, by extension, to pressure manufacturers to seek approval
for certain off-label uses. Second, because of the size and complexity
of the Medicare and Medicaid regimes in general, we believe that the
only means to ensure compliance is to deny reimbursements to those
who fail to provide diagnostic codes. This approach, though harsh, is
the
traditional
way
of
incentivizing
compliance
with
136
and we see no reason why this
Medicare/Medicaid policies,
requirement should be the exception. Finally, with respect to
Professor Herbst’s concern about physicians responding to this
requirement by writing fraudulent prescriptions (to provide drugs to
their patients while also protecting their own reimbursements), we
believe that she overlooks the capacity of the Medicare/Medicaid
fraud-prevention apparatus to combat such activities. Indeed, just as
President Obama’s healthcare policy places increasing emphasis on
enhancing data collection, it imposes stricter punishments on
physicians who engage in Medicare/Medicaid fraud through
inappropriate billing—targeting and deterring doctors who embrace
precisely the strategies that Professor Herbst identifies, however
137
noble their motives may be.
Denying Medicare/Medicaid
reimbursements for healthcare professionals’ failure to include
diagnostic codes in the context of off-label drug use, therefore, is
unlikely to present the challenges Professor Herbst identifies and is
instead a critical step in promoting compliance with this policy.
4. Enhanced Reporting in Prescription of Certain FDADesignated Drugs. We suggest that the FDA can and should be able
to create a subset of certain designated drugs for which all scripts
must include diagnostic use. This suggestion reflects a simple and
long-recognized reality of off-label drug use in the United States: it is
heavily concentrated in the uses of certain drugs, for which there is
often little or no evidence supporting its effectiveness. For example,
the off-label use of antidepressant drugs such as promethazine,
138
clonazepam, and Seroquel all exceed 75 percent of their total use;
likewise, the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN)

136. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(e) (2014) (authorizing a Medicare intermediary to suspend
reimbursement payments to a provider that fails to maintain adequate medical records, as
defined by 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(d) (2014)).
137. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, The
Affordable Care Act and Fighting Fraud, STOP MEDICARE FRAUD, http://www.stopmedicare
fraud.gov/aboutfraud/aca-fraud/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
138. Walton et al., supra note 103, at 1447.
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estimates that 50 to 75 percent of all anticancer therapy prescriptions
139
are off-label. In areas such as these, particularly where there have
been numerous adverse events or other “red flags” of potential harm,
the FDA should have the option—though not the obligation—to
impose stricter requirements, such as the use of a diagnostic code at
the prescription stage. This is something that a number of insurers
and managed care organizations already require internally, but they
have no obligation to share their data with the FDA.
The key benefit of this policy would be to give the FDA the tools
it needs to more closely monitor extrapolated uses of drugs where
they are likely to be prevalent and harmful; although this level of
information for all prescriptions may be unnecessary, it is important
for the subset of drugs that have been of greatest concern for
researchers, health professionals, and regulators. Further, to the
extent that this designation would impose new costs on manufacturers
of certain drugs, we expect that these manufacturers would either
bear this cost or seek FDA approval for the use; we do not, in other
words, anticipate that these prescriptions would universally halt in a
manner that would be harmful to patients.
We emphasize that the data underlying such designations (such
as the percentage of off-label use for certain drugs and the number of
adverse events) is already well developed in the medical literature for
a number of drugs, and that the FDA could likely work from existing
information in choosing which drugs, if any, would be placed into this
140
category. This suggestion, therefore, would essentially allow the
FDA to pick its battles, and do so without imposing substantial costs
on manufacturers and healthcare professionals.
5. Crowdsourcing Big-Data Analytics. Together, the mechanisms
we propose would produce a far more comprehensive picture of the
scope of off-label use. The collected data would facilitate the FDA’s
internal analyses, which in turn would improve agency determinations
related to postmarket testing requirements and enforcement,
discussed below.

139. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 111, at 40.
140. See generally Laura Cuzzolin, Ada Zaccaron & Vassilios Fanos, Unlicensed and OffLabel Uses of Drugs in Paediatrics: A Review of the Literature, 17 FUNDAMENTAL & CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 125 (2003) (reviewing the literature concerning off-label uses of pediatric
drugs).
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The FDA should also leverage its resources by publishing the
data it collects in a de-identified manner (that is, without patients’
141
protected health information). The dataset that would result from
our proposed collection activities would have substantial value to a
range of stakeholders. Government agencies, such as the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the National Institutes of
Health, and the National Science Foundation, study off-label use and
could use the data collected by the FDA to improve evidence-based
regulations. This would also be the case with nonprofit organizations,
such as the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN). CMS
and private insurers would utilize the data to make coverage and
formulary determinations. Academics would use the data for healthservices research. Pharmaceutical companies would have the option
to do the same to limit their tort liability, and they could use the data
for new drug development. More ambitiously, to achieve vigorous
participation, new incentives could be created for private parties to
142
supplement the FDA’s activities in this area.
B. Improved Testing
The second element of our proposal is to substantially expand
the FDA’s use of postmarket testing of off-label drug use. As the
most basic method to enhance testing of off-label drug use, the FDA
should more aggressively exercise the authority Congress granted it in
2007 to require more postmarket testing of off-label drug use, and to
demand that manufacturers comply with the FDA’s requests for such
testing. Our primary proposal for improved reporting buttresses this
recommendation: if the FDA had better information regarding offlabel use, as we suggest it should, it would be in a far better position
to identify the drugs in need of postmarket testing and far more likely
to utilize PMRs effectively.

141. As Professor Ryan Abbott has previously explained:
The public does not have unrestricted access to the FDA’s data, but the FDA does
provide the number of reports it has received for products over the past decade, and
persons familiar with relational database creation can extract raw data from
individual case safety reports. Also, the public can obtain individual case safety
reports from FAERS through a Freedom of Information (“FOI”) request to the
FDA. Finally, the FDA publishes quarterly reports on potential serious side effects
identified by FAERS and summarizes information about ongoing and completed
postmarket safety evaluations of adverse experience reports.
Abbott, supra note 4, at 240 (citations omitted).
142. See generally id. (reviewing existing incentives and proposing an administrative bounty
system to incentivize third parties to submit information to the FDA).

ABBOTT AYRES IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/17/2014 8:34 PM

410

[Vol. 64:377

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

The FDA’s decision to require postmarketing testing should be
143
guided by a weighing of the following factors:
1. Frequency of off-label use. Here, we suggest that drugs whose
off-label use represents a substantial percentage—perhaps even a
majority—of their overall use should attract the attention of
144
regulators as likely candidates for postmarket testing.
2. Proximity of off-label use to approved use. Here, we
recommend a model that looks beyond the frequency of off-label
use to consider how different those off-label uses are from the
approved use. Thus, a high frequency of very similar—though offlabel—uses may be less likely to trigger a requirement of postmarket
testing than a low frequency of very different uses. Put another way,
an off-label use whose extrapolation is along a continuous variable
already relevant to the drug’s approval (such as age or weight), and
small in magnitude, should be less likely to trigger scrutiny than a
use that introduces an altogether new variable (such as an off-label
treatment of overactive bladders when the drug is approved for
145
treatment of wrinkles and aging ). The logic of including this
variable is related to our metapoint regarding extrapolation: we
should have more confidence in the safety of modest (even if
frequent) extrapolations than dramatic (even if infrequent) ones.
3. Frequency of adverse events associated with off-label use. This
variable is relatively straightforward: a high frequency of adverse
events should increase the appropriateness of postmarket testing.
4. Difference between severity of adverse events associated with
off-label use and severity of condition if untreated by off-label use.
Beyond the frequency of the adverse events, we propose a model
that would weigh adverse events according to their severity. Thus, a
handful of extremely severe adverse events (such as death) may be
143. Consistent with our approach, regulators and commentators have discussed and applied
a variety of risk–benefit principles to new drug approval. See generally, e.g., Louis P. Garrison,
Jr., Adrian Towse & Brian W. Bresnahan, Assessing a Structured, Quantitative Health Outcomes
Approach to Drug Risk-Benefit Analysis, 26 HEALTH AFF. 684 (2007) (discussing the current
risk-benefit framework for new drug approval and proposing an alternative structured
framework).
144. Of course, as we discuss under variable 2, certain drugs have very frequent off-label use
simply because that use is not so “off-label”—that is, the off-label use differs only very slightly
from the approved use (for example, use by individuals just outside the approved age range, or
use at dosages slightly outside the approved range). We do not, therefore, suggest that all drugs
with heavy off-label use should automatically be subject to extensive postmarket testing; rather,
by incorporating variable 2 into the analysis, we suspect that many drugs in this category would
not require postmarket testing because their off-label use is so similar to the approved use.
145. See Feeley & Milford, supra note 112.
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more likely to result in postmarket testing than a large number of
less severe—yet still reportable—adverse events (such as mild
headaches). Yet, as the title of this variable suggests, merely looking
at the severity of adverse events cannot be sufficient. Instead, we
must compare the severity of what could go wrong with the harm
from not using the drug for this off-label purpose at all. In essence,
this requires an evaluation of the potential upside of the use in
146
comparison with the potential downside. For example, using a
medication that may relieve acne but has also resulted in some
serious birth defects would be very likely to trigger a requirement of
postmarket testing—here, the benefit of off-label use is relatively
low whereas the cost may be extremely high. By contrast, using a
drug that may cause heart attacks but has the potential to cure a
fatal disease would be less likely to trigger testing requirements—
here, the cost of not using the drug for this off-label purpose (death)
is much greater than the cost of the harms that may result from
doing so (serious potential side effects). The potential downside
from the use is small because the patient was already expecting a
poor outcome.
5. Difference in sample size between approved use and off-label
use. Postmarket testing is more appropriate where the off-label use
represents an extrapolation into the “hump” of the distribution
versus into the “tail.” Postmarket testing is more likely to produce
reliable results—and is thus more appropriate—where the
population size of off-label users is sufficiently large. When
extrapolating into the tail of relatively infrequent use, regulators
without the possibility of credible testing will at times need to make
the approval decision on the basis of other factors—such as
proximity and the relative upside of the use—without the benefit of
147
additional evidence.

By formally considering these variables, and perhaps others, the
FDA would have a more systematic and effective means of evaluating

146. For a discussion comparing the expected upside and downside and exploring
“asymmetric payoffs” and strategies to minimize downside risks while increasing upside risks,
see NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 157–67
(2012).
147. Note that this variable is distinct from the frequency of off-label use (variable 1). Here,
our concern is not with how often people actually use a given drug off-label, but rather how
large the group of potential off-label users might be. Whereas variable 1 expresses a sensitivity
to the scale of off-label use (and thus to the scale of any potential harm from it), variable 5
instead focuses on the feasibility of studying off-label use as compared to approved use of a
drug.
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whether postmarket testing is necessary. The results of applying
these variables could be surprising: for example, the widespread use
of a headache drug to cure a minor toe fungus where such use may
result in stomach pains may be more likely to trigger the requirement
of postmarket testing than the use of a similar headache drug to cure
a terminal illness where this use may result in heart attacks. But we
believe this holistic, multifactor analysis is necessary to optimize
extrapolation of approved drugs, protect patients, and avoid sinking
unnecessary costs into studies that are unlikely to meaningfully
improve patient care. This framework is but one illustration of the
kind of analysis that the FDA should adopt in evaluating the
appropriateness of postmarket testing.
C. Improved Enforcement
As the final component of our proposal, we call for a tiered
labeling system to influence off-label prescribing and to enhance the
FDA’s ability to influence physicians’ prescribing practices. This
framework would allow the FDA to draw finer distinctions among
various drug uses, and it would provide the agency both the
regulatory teeth and the flexibility it presently lacks. A critical benefit
to these mechanisms is that, once implemented, they would primarily
rely on third parties and market forces for enforcement, and
therefore require minimal agency resources.
Under the model we describe below, unapproved and potentially
harmful drug uses could be grouped into categories that vary in the
costs and liabilities they impose on prescribers and manufacturers: (1)
red-box uses, (2) black-box uses, and (3) gray-box uses. The agency
could retain unboxed warnings and precautions, and continue its
practice of simply not listing off-label uses where there is inadequate
information to support a warning. A new category of conditional offlabel use would allow sponsors actively complying with PMRs and
PMCs to promote the study to healthcare providers. REMS and
ETASU could apply to a drug in any category. Table 1 summarizes
these categories and their consequences for physicians, pharmacists,
and patients:

148. Though we have stopped short of supplying a formula that incorporates these variables,
we can imagine several possible iterations (for example, where T represents the appropriateness
of testing, T = a*b + c*d + e).
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Table 1. Enforcement Mechanisms by FDA Designation
Physician/
Pharmacist
Liability

FDA Designation
Red-Box
Uses
Black-Box
Uses
Gray-Box
Uses
Unboxed
Warning
No Warning

✔

R
E
M
S
&

E
T
A
S
U

Required
Diagnostic
Codes

Promotion
Bar

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

Denial of
Medicare/
Medicaid
Reimbursement

Heightened
Malpractice
Liability

✔
✔

Conditional
Off-Label
On-Label
Check marks indicate the presence of an enforcement mechanism. Shading indicates the extent to which the
mechanism is present: black (fully present), gray (somewhat present), and white (not present). The REMS
& ETASU column indicates that FDA use designations could be combined with REMS and ETASU
requirements.

As Table 1 suggests, a drug use that falls into one of the stronger
labeling categories is subject not only to its own unique enforcement
mechanism, but also to downstream enforcement mechanisms
associated with less stringent labeling categories. For example, both
red-box and gray-box warnings require a diagnostic code to be
associated with a prescription. With regard to malpractice liability,
any off-label use is associated with enhanced liability to the extent it
differs from the standard of care. However, stricter FDA warnings
would influence the standard of care both by directly impacting the
way doctors prescribe, and by serving as evidence of the standard of
care in malpractice suits. In this way, violating a red-box warning
would be stronger evidence of malpractice than prescribing off-label
149
in the absence of any warning. Assignment to labeling categories
would be facilitated by the improved reporting mechanisms discussed
previously.
As the most severe enforcement category, which we might
consider the “nuclear” option, we propose a new red-box warning
that would be reserved for the most dangerous and most problematic
instances of off-label drug use. For the rare uses that would fall within
this category, physicians and pharmacists would face liability for their
149. For further background on the increased risk of malpractice liability in the context of
off-label drug use, including for drugs with black-box warnings, see Judith G. Edersheim &
Theodore A. Stern, Liability Associated with Prescribing Medications, 11 PRIMARY CARE
COMPANION J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 115, 117–18 (2009).
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roles in making and filling such prescriptions. The simplest liability
mechanism could be a statement to the effect that the FDA considers
violating a red-box warning conclusive evidence of malpractice and
grounds for discipline by a state board. This would not guarantee
practitioner liability, as it would depend on state courts and medical
boards for enforcement, but it would avoid the need for the agency to
be responsible for enforcement at the provider level, something it
does not currently do. State courts and medical boards would have to
be willing to accept the FDA’s authority in this area, and state
legislatures would have to acquiesce to and not obstruct the FDA’s
augmented role. In today’s political environment, it is easy to imagine
a state legislature passing a law to the effect that providers cannot be
held liable in state tort suits for violating red-box warnings. This
possibility is not necessarily fatal to our proposal, as having some
states challenge red-box warnings would essentially create a
randomized trial to measure the efficacy of the red-box system. In any
case, regardless of the extent to which provider liability is enforced by
third parties, an FDA statement to the effect that a red-box violation
is malpractice and grounds for discipline is likely to have a very strong
effect on prescribing practices. More ambitiously, a statutory
amendment might provide for direct civil liability to the agency.
Whatever the nature of red-box liability, this category of warnings
would be designed to completely prohibit particular off-label uses.
However, in the event that an individual patient had an unusual and
compelling need that might justify an off-label use in violation of a
red-box warning, the FDA could consider exceptions on a patient-bypatient basis with the agency’s approval (similar to the compassionate
151
use program).
A black-box warning, by contrast, would represent an
intermediate level of enforcement. In this category, physicians would
remain free to make such prescriptions, and pharmacists would face
no special liability for filling them. However, as with black-box
warnings now, the disclosure would be prominent, and providers
would be discouraged from violating black-box warnings due to
150. An example might be the use of thalidomide in a pregnant patient. Margaret Hamburg,
50 Years After Thalidomide: Why Regulation Matters, FDA VOICE (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2012/02/50-years-after-thalidomide-why-regulationmatters.
151. See Understanding Expanded Access/Compassionate Use, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/ExpandedAccess/ucm20041768.htm (last updated Oct.
23, 2014) (discussing the FDA’s compassionate use program).

ABBOTT AYRES IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

EVIDENCE AND EXTRAPOLATION

11/17/2014 8:34 PM

415

malpractice liability. For uses that are not concerning enough to
prohibit outright with red-box warnings but too concerning to allow
providers to prescribe routinely, the FDA could combine black-box
warnings with ETASU requirements. As a novel ETASU mechanism,
certain uses might require written informed consent from patients for
152
the off-label use. To the extent that the off-label use in question is
concerning, requiring informed consent would reduce the prevalence
of that use because obtaining written informed consent from patients
is somewhat burdensome on physicians. It would also improve patient
engagement and education.
Gray-box warnings would be intended to eliminate insurance
coverage for particular off-label uses by stating that there is evidence
that the risks are likely to exceed the benefits for a specific off-label
use. Gray-box warnings should prevent Medicare/Medicaid
reimbursement. While CMS does not generally reimburse for offlabel use, it may as a result of private compendia or its internal
analyses. Gray-box warnings, however, should presumptively
preclude CMS reimbursement, unless CMS makes a deliberate
153
decision to the contrary. Gray-box warnings would allow the FDA
to disseminate its internal analyses, along with analyses it collects
from elsewhere (including from CMS, the European Medicines
Agency, and academic publications) and validates. This system would
also promote greater interagency collaboration. A gray-box warning
is also likely to have a strong impact on private-insurancereimbursement decisions, as it works to control healthcare costs, and
because private-insurance reimbursement often tracks CMS
reimbursement.
For any drug with any category of boxed warning, we propose
that physicians should be required to report diagnostic codes before a
prescription can be filled. Pharmacies would then be responsible for
submitting this data to the FDA. For drugs that are concerning
enough to warrant an off-label boxed warning, it is important that
152. See REMS and Opioid Analgesics Webinar Outline, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 13,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/UCM163668.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5, 2014). Under the FDA’s ETASU requirements for this class of drugs, the
prescribing physician must monitor the patient every six months, and the patient must be
enrolled in a registry. Id.
153. Compendia have been criticized as lacking in consistency, quality, transparency, and
timeliness. Tillman et al., supra note 65, at 349. Reimbursement based on compendia can be
required by statute, so this particular mechanism may require statutory amendment. R. Dresser
& J. Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional and Government
Oversight, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 480 (2009).
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accurate data be available on the scope of the off-label use. For uses
that do not warrant a boxed warning, we would retain the existing
154
system for unboxed warnings and precautions. Of course, not all
off-label uses are associated with a warning, so the vast majority of
off-label uses would not be listed on the label or associated with any
kind of warning (“off-label” in Table 1).
There is a risk with boxed warnings, particularly with red-box
warnings, that the FDA will prevent potentially beneficial uses.
Therefore, these warnings should be implemented sparingly. The risk
of chilling beneficial uses is significantly less with the use of unboxed
warnings. The warnings would not be entirely toothless: the
disclosure requirements would impose additional costs on
manufacturers and prescribers, and heightened malpractice liability
would be associated with unapproved use of the drug. But
enforcement against off-label uses of drugs in this category would be
significantly less stringent than in boxed categories. Unboxed
warnings would thus make sense as only one of several effective tools
in the FDA’s toolbox. This spectrum of regulatory options would
allow the FDA to better distinguish between high-risk uses and likely
harmless ones.
Finally, our enforcement system could be used to improve
sponsor compliance with agreed-upon postmarket studies using a
package of the proverbial sticks and carrots. Namely, sponsors
actively completing PMRs and PMCs would be permitted to inform
healthcare providers about their studies as part of the “conditional
155
off-label” designation.
This designation would remove the
promotion bar for discussing off-label uses within the context of the
clinical trial, and it would be a positive incentive for sponsors to
conduct trials. In the event a sponsor failed to meet milestones for its
PMRs and PMCs, such failures would automatically trigger a graybox warning, followed eventually by a black-box warning. This system
would provide a stronger series of incentives for manufacturers to
154. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY WARNINGS AND PRECAUTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND BOXED WARNING
SECTIONS OF LABELING FOR HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS –
CONTENT AND FORMAT (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/
ucm075096.pdf.
155. This is more liberal than the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, which permitted pharmaceutical companies to
advertise that they were conducting a clinical trial when it was for the purposes of a new-use
approval. See id. § 401, 111 Stat. at 2357–58. That regulation has expired. See id., 111 Stat. at
2364.
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complete agreed-upon trials, and has the advantage of taking effect
without a significant additional expenditure of agency resources or
the need to overcome bureaucratic inertia or make a politically
contentious determination. However, the agency would have the
option to postpone or prevent the automatic implementation of a
boxed warning for good cause.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES: SEROQUEL AND LAP-BAND
A. The Making of an All-Purpose Psychiatric Drug
156

Psychosis is a loss of contact with reality. Symptoms of
psychosis include delusions (false beliefs not amenable to change in
light of conflicting evidence), hallucinations (perception-like
experiences that occur without an external stimulus), and
157
disorganized thinking. Psychotic patients are at risk for agitation,
aggression, and impulsivity which can make them a danger to
158
themselves and others. Psychosis can occur as the result of
underlying mental illness—for example, as a result of schizophrenia.
Schizophrenia is a psychiatric disorder involving chronic or recurrent
159
psychosis, and is one of the top twenty causes of disability
160
worldwide. Psychosis may also be caused by mental illnesses such as
161
bipolar mania or depression with psychotic features. It is also
common in patients with dementia or delirium; up to 40 percent of
162
patients with Alzheimer’s disease have psychotic symptoms. In
addition, psychosis can occur as a result of general medical conditions
163
or a substance-use disorder. Psychosis is relatively common—it

156. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS § 309.81 (4th ed. 1994).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Michael D. Jibson, Overview of Psychosis, UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/
contents/overview-of-psychosis?source=search_result&search=psychosis&selectedTitle=1%
7E150 (last updated Nov. 1, 2013).
160. T. Vos et al., Years Lived with Disability (YLDs) for 1160 Sequelae of 289 Diseases and
Injuries 1990–2010: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010, 380
LANCET 2163, 2196 (2012).
161. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 156, at 87–88.
162. See Jibson, supra note 159.
163. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 156, at 87–88.
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affects more than 3 percent of the population at some point in their
164
lives.
The primary treatment for psychosis and schizophrenia is
165
antipsychotic medications. The first generation of these drugs,
166
“typical antipsychotics,” was discovered starting in the 1950s. These
167
drugs are effective, but they also cause significant side effects. Firstgeneration antipsychotics can cause permanent abnormal body
movements, including tremors and Parkinson’s disease–type
movements, as well as body rigidity and neuroleptic malignant
168
syndrome, a rare but potentially fatal side effect. They also cause a
host of other problems, ranging from sexual dysfunction, to excessive
169
sedation, to endocrine disorders. These problems are prevalent and
severe enough that patient noncompliance with directions to use
170
typical antipsychotics is common.
The second generation of
antipsychotic drugs, “atypical antipsychotics,” was thought to be far
171
safer.
The first atypical antipsychotic agent, Clozapine, was
marketed heavily on the basis of an improved side-effect profile, as
172
were the other atypical antipsychotic agents that followed.
Aggressive marketing continued even as evidence emerged that
173
contradicted those safety claims. For example, a 2005 study in the

164. See Jonna Perälä et al., Lifetime Prevalence of Psychotic and Bipolar I Disorders in a
General Population, 64 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 19, 19 (2007).
165. See John M. Grohol, Schizophrenia Treatment, PSYCHCENTRAL, http://psychcentral
.com/disorders/sx31t.htm (last updated Oct. 9, 2013).
166. See Michael D. Jibson, First-Generation Antipsychotic Medications: Pharmacology,
Administration, and Comparative Side Effects, UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/
contents/first-generation-antipsychotic-medications-pharmacology-administration-andcomparative-side-effects (last updated Mar. 11, 2014); Michael D. Jibson, Second-Generation
Antipsychotic Medications: Pharmacology, Administration, and Comparative Side Effects,
UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/contents/second-generation-antipsychotic-medicationspharmacology-administration-and-comparative-side-effects (last updated Apr. 30, 2014)
(comparing first- and second-generation antipsychotics).
167. See sources cited supra note 166.
168. See sources cited supra note 166.
169. See PATRICK W. CORRIGAN ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRIC
REHABILITATION: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 163, 167–68 (2008); John Muench & Ann M.
Hammer, Adverse Effects of Antipsychotic Medications, 81 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 617, 619–21
(2010).
170. See Ghaseen Saba et al., Patients’ Health Literacy in Psychotic Disorders, 3
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 511, 511 (2007).
171. See sources cited supra note 166.
172. See Herbert Y. Meltzer, Clozapine: Balancing Safety with Superior Antipsychotic
Efficacy, CLINICAL SCHIZOPHRENIA & RELATED PSYCHOSES, Oct. 2012, at 134, 135–36.
173. See id.
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New England Journal of Medicine showed that the increase in the risk
of death for elderly patients taking atypical antipsychotic agents was
174
on par with that associated with taking typical antipsychotic agents.
On the basis of a review of the existing evidence in 2008, the editors
of the Lancet concluded that “the time has come to abandon the
terms first-generation and second-generation antipsychotics, as they do
175
not merit this distinction.”
Seroquel (one of the brand names for the generic drug
quetiapine fumarate) is a second-generation antipsychotic
manufactured by AstraZeneca that was approved by the FDA in
176
1997. It is now approved for the treatment of schizophrenia and
mania-associated bipolar disorder, and Seroquel XR (the extendedrelease iteration of the drug) is approved for adjunct treatment of
177
major depressive disorder (MDD). Over its lifetime, Seroquel has
been subject to sixty-one labeling revisions, efficacy-supplement
additions, patient-population alterations, packaging changes, and
178
indication modifications. In 2009, a black-box warning was added to
advise that elderly patients with dementia-related psychosis treated
with Seroquel are at an increased risk of death, and that Seroquel
179
increases the risk of suicide in young persons. Those risks apply to

174. Philip S. Wang, Sebastian Schneeweiss, Jerry Avorn, Michael A. Fischer, Helen
Mogun, Daniel H. Solomon & M. Alan Brookhart, Risk of Death in Elderly Users of
Conventional vs. Atypical Antipsychotic Medications, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2335, 2335 (2005).
175. Peter Tyrer & Tim Kendall, The Spurious Advance of Antipsychotic Drug Therapy, 373
LANCET 4, 5 (2009) (emphasis added).
176. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LABEL AND APPROVAL HISTORY, DRUGS@FDA:
FDA APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/
index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.DrugDetails (search for “SEROQUEL”; then follow
“SEROQUEL”) (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (“Original Approval . . . Date September 26, 1997”).
177. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION:
SEROQUEL (QUETIAPINE FUMARATE) TABLETS (2013), available at http://www.accessdata
.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/020639s061lbl.pdf; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: SEROQUEL XR (QUETIAPINE FUMARATE)
TABLETS (2013), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/
022047s034lbl.pdf.
178. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 176.
179. Drug Safety Labeling Changes: Seroquel (quetiapine fumarate) Tablets August 2008,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/SafetyInformation/SafetyRelatedDrugLabelingChanges/ucm123259.htm (last updated June 19, 2009) (“Warning:
Increased Mortality in Elderly Patients with Dementia-Related Psychosis—Elderly patients
with dementia-related psychosis treated with antipsychotic drugs are at an increased risk of
death. . . . SEROQUEL is not approved for the treatment of patients with dementia-related
psychosis.”).
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the entire class of atypical antipsychotics. Also in 2009, the FDA
required AstraZeneca to implement a REMS for Seroquel, which
required a medication guide and periodic assessments that included a
survey of patients’ understanding of the potential risks of Seroquel,
including
mortality
in
the
elderly,
hyperglycemia,
181
hypercholesterolemia, and weight gain. The REMS was “released”
182
(discontinued) in November 2011. However, the FDA continues to
require the medication guide as part of the approved labeling for
183
Seroquel.
Off-label uses of Seroquel are common—and troubling. For
example, the AHRQ found that “at one large acute-care psychiatric
hospital, [Seroquel] was used extensively for off-label conditions, and
184
in a variety of off-label doses.” Moreover, “only a quarter of
patients had one of the diagnoses for which [Seroquel] is approved,
and only a third received [Seroquel] in a standing dose regimen.
Depression and substance-use disorders were found to be the most
185
common associated diagnoses.” Other off-label uses are for sleep
disorders, anxiety, autism, panic attacks, headaches, restlessness,
186
nervousness, dementia, and agitation. An investigation of Florida’s
Department of Juvenile Justice found that the agency bought twice as
much Seroquel as Ibuprofen in 2007, “routinely [doling it] out for
187
reasons that never were approved by federal regulators.” Military
spending on Seroquel has increased “more than sevenfold” since
2001, as veterans’ doctors frequently prescribe it for insomnia and

180. Id.
181. FDA Approves Once-Daily SEROQUEL XR Extended Release Tablets, NEWS MED.
(Dec. 4, 2009, 7:37 AM), http://www.news-medical.net/news/20091204/FDA-approves-oncedaily-SEROQUEL-XR-Extended-Release-Tablets.aspx.
182. Postmarket Drug Safety Information for Patients and Providers: Released REMS, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafety
InformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm393231.htm (last updated Aug. 12, 2014).
183. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RELEASE REMS REQUIREMENT 2 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2011/020639s055ltr.pdf.
184. Margaret Maglione et al., Off-Label Use of Atypical Antipsychotics: An Update, 43
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS REVIEWS 20 (2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
n/cer43/pdf/.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 29–33 (listing treatment for a variety of conditions, some involving off-label
uses of antipsychotics).
187. Michael LaForgia, Huge Doses of Potent Antipsychotics Flow into State Jails for
Troubled Kids, PALM BEACH POST, May 24, 2011, at 1A.

ABBOTT AYRES IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

11/17/2014 8:34 PM

EVIDENCE AND EXTRAPOLATION

421

188

post-traumatic stress disorder. The Institute for Safe Medication
Practices found that 47 percent of the adverse events from 2004 to
189
2010 occurred when the drug was being used off-label. Off-label
uses of Seroquel also occur in violation of its black-box warning.
Elderly patients with dementia continue to receive Seroquel in
significant numbers, despite the evidence of increased risk of death
and the availability of alternate treatment options such as mood
190
stabilizers. As of 2010, a study found that it was still the case that
almost “10% of prescription drug uses for dementia among elderly
191
patients are for atypical antipsychotics.”
The prevalence of Seroquel’s off-label uses should not be
surprising, because AstraZeneca promoted the drug aggressively for
192
such uses. As Seroquel became increasingly profitable, AstraZeneca
193
even engineered deliberately misleading promotions. The company
promoted the drug as better than generic without scientific evidence,
and as weight-neutral despite knowing that Seroquel caused weight

188. Matthew Perrone, Deaths Raise Questions on Drug Given to Sleepless Vets, NBC
NEWS, Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38917668/ns/health-mental_health/t/deathsraise-questions-drug-given-sleepless-vets/.
189. Jim Edwards, How Seroquel, a Risky Antipsychotic, Became a “General Purpose”
Mental Health Drug, CBS MONEY WATCH (Mar. 27, 2011, 4:48 PM), http://www.cbsnews
.com/news/how-seroquel-a-risky-antipsychotic-became-a-general-purpose-mental-health-drug.
190. Sudeep S. Gill et al., Antipsychotic Drug Use and Mortality in Older Adults with
Dementia, 146 ANN. INTERN. MED. 775, 775 (2007).
191. Dorsey et al., supra note 98, at 101. In 2003, there were 590,000 drug uses in which
atypical antipsychotics were used among individuals sixty-five years and older with dementia.
Id. at 99. That number peaked in 2004 at 780,000 uses, then declined to 400,000 in 2008 (the last
year examined in the study). Id. The study concluded that the black-box warning decreased use
of the medication. Id. at 96. Still, the use of atypical antipsychotics for dementia continues. Id.
The study also noted that the most recent figures on new atypical antipsychotic prescriptions,
from December 2008, showed “there were 8000 new atypical drug uses each month among
patients with dementia, despite the increased risk of death and limited evidence of their
efficacy.” Id. at 101.
192. Edwards, supra note 189.
193. Duff Wilson, For $520 Million, AstraZeneca Settles Case over Marketing of a Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/business/28drug.html
(“‘AstraZeneca paid kickbacks to doctors as part of an illegal scheme to market drugs for
unapproved uses,’ Kathleen Sebelius, secretary of health and human services, said . . . .”).
Moreover,
From 2004 to 2008, the mean cost of typical antipsychotic prescription increased 8%
from $38 to $41, while the cost of an atypical prescription increased by 43% from
$226 to $323. In 2008, US $0.06 billion was spent on typical agents and $9.9 billion
spent on atypical agents in the United States. Given these costs, we estimate that in
2008 $6.0 billion was expended on off-label use of antipsychotic medications, of which
$5.4 billion was for uses with uncertain evidence.
Alexander et al., supra note 40, at 181.
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195

gain. Seroquel became a “general purpose psychiatric drug.”
AstraZeneca’s promotion campaign was enormously successful, and
196
Seroquel earned $4.87 billion for the company in 2009. Although
total AstraZeneca earnings stood at $33 billion in 2010, Seroquel
197
sales made up 40 percent of the company’s pretax profit. The pretax
198
profit margin on Seroquel sales exceeded 80 percent.
Eventually, AstraZeneca was sued by the Department of Justice
199
(DOJ) for promoting off-label uses. The DOJ settled its case for
$520 million in 2009, noting, “the company recruited doctors to serve
as authors of articles that were ghostwritten by medical literature
companies . . . about studies the doctors in question did not conduct.
AstraZeneca then used those studies and articles as the basis for
200
promotional messages about unapproved uses of Seroquel.” The
201
company was also sued by numerous patients. In 2010, AstraZeneca
settled two-thirds of the lawsuits against them for a total of $198
202
million. However, perverse incentives are at work: the drug was so
profitable that even after the FDA required the company to warn

194. Jim Edwards, E-Mail: AstraZeneca Knew in 1997 That Seroquel Caused Weight Gain,
CBS MONEY WATCH (Mar. 3, 2009, 2:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/e-mailastrazeneca-knew-in-1997-that-seroquel-caused-weight-gain (“AstraZeneca knew as far back as
1997 that Seroquel put patients at risk of weight gain, according to the company’s own internal
memos. The documents also appear to show that some [AstraZeneca] executives developed
strategies to ‘neutralize’ [the claim that] Seroquel caused weight gain or diabetes, even after the
FDA asked the company to warn patients about Seroquel’s diabetes side effect.”); see also Jim
Edwards, The Dog Ate AstraZeneca’s Homework! Evidence on Misleading Drug Ad Disappears
from Company’s Files, CBS MONEY WATCH (July 10, 2010, 6:40 PM), http://www
.cbsnews.com/news/the-dog-ate-astrazenecas-homework-evidence-on-misleading-drug-addisappears-from-companys-files (“AstraZeneca (AZN) says it has lost a crucial internal
document that would explain how an ad for its antipsychotic Seroquel misleadingly claimed
there was ‘no weight gain’ with the drug and described its ‘favorable weight profile.’”).
195. Edwards, supra note 189.
196. Jim Edwards, AstraZeneca’s Marketing Strategy: Sue Us, Please!, CBS MONEY WATCH
(Aug. 5, 2010, 11:06 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/astrazenecas-marketing-strategy-sueus-please.
197. Jim Edwards, How a Single Patent Expiry Could Wipe Out 40% of AstraZeneca’s
Profits, CBS MONEY WATCH (Feb. 7, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-asingle-patent-expiry-could-wipe-out-40-of-astrazenecas-profits.
198. Id.
199. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Pharmaceutical Giant AstraZeneca To Pay $520 Million for
Off-label Drug Marketing (2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-civ-487.html.
200. Id.
201. Edwards, supra note 196.
202. Id.
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203

that Seroquel may cause diabetes the company continued to use
204
promotional materials without the warning. Financially, it worked
out that it was more profitable to continue with misleading
advertisements and to settle civil claims than to provide accurate
205
information to potential users.
B. The Seroquel Dynamic Extrapolation Approach
Seroquel can illustrate the advantages of our proposed
framework. However, this Section is only intended to highlight key
considerations and broad policy options; definitive determinations
related to testing and labeling requirements would require a far more
detailed evaluation.
The case of Seroquel raises two primary extrapolation-related
issues: First, should Seroquel be used for unapproved conditions, and
if so, which conditions? For example, should it be used for anxiety or
dementia or post-traumatic stress disorder? Second, should Seroquel
be used in different populations than those for which it was originally
approved? In other words, should it be used in very young or very old
populations, or in the pregnant-women population, none of which
were examined in the original preapproval process? Other
extrapolation issues include duration of use and substitution: Should
Seroquel be prescribed for a longer time period than the duration of
treatment evaluated in preapproval testing? Should it be used
indefinitely when there is limited information available about longterm use? Can Seroquel XR safely be used in place of Seroquel?
To evaluate all of these extrapolation issues, our approach begins
with data collection. For a new drug, this would include only
preapproval clinical data, or data available from foreign countries if
the drug has already been in use outside the United States. For a drug
like Seroquel that has been in use for about fifteen years since its
initial FDA approval, observational data will be available for each
individual extrapolation. However, the data currently available to the
agency is inferior to the data that would be available under the
collection system we propose. Unfortunately, because the data we
203. Letter from Michelle Safarik, Regulatory Review Officer, Div. of Drug Marketing,
Adver., & Commc’ns, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to James L. Gaskill, Dir., Promotional
Regulatory Affairs, AstraZeneca LP (July 29, 2010), available at http://www.fda
.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyF
DA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM221315.pdf.
204. Id.; Edwards, supra note 196.
205. Edwards, supra note 196.
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advocate the FDA to collect is not available, it cannot be used here to
demonstrate how it would affect downstream decisions related to
testing and labeling. Our case study is restricted to the data currently
available. Still, under the collection system we propose, regulators
would have a far-clearer picture of Seroquel’s off-label use. Because
Seroquel has a boxed warning, under our framework physicians
would be required to report the indication for which the drug is being
prescribed.
With regard to postmarket studies, each extrapolation requires
its own analysis. Our case-study analysis will focus on an off-label use
that has been particularly concerning to regulators: using Seroquel for
dementia-related psychosis in elderly patients. In fact, that off-label
use is a combination of two distinct extrapolations, as the drug is
being prescribed for an unapproved use (dementia) and in an
unstudied population (geriatric patients). Combining multiple
extrapolations has the potential to create safety problems that might
not exist with either extrapolation in isolation. In the case of this
combined extrapolation, the following factors would support an
argument in favor of additional testing: a substantial percentage of
Seroquel’s overall use was off-label, as well as used off-label
specifically for dementia and geriatric treatment; Seroquel’s off-label
use occurred, in part, across discrete conditions (schizophrenia versus
dementia); adverse events were relatively frequent (for example,
there was a greater than 5 percent incidence of weight gain) and
severe (for example, the risk of death for Seroquel users rose to
between 1.6 to 1.7 times the risk of death in placebo-treated patients);
and, there is a large population of off-label users. Mitigating the need
for postmarket testing would be the fact that Seroquel treats
symptoms of dementia, which are serious, and that the off-label use
here was in part along a continuous variable (age).
The factor-weighing analysis here supports requiring postmarket
testing. This type of analysis would be an ongoing process for each
extrapolation, so when data collection or surveillance reveals, for
example, a higher incidence of off-label use for geriatric patients, that
might alter the calculus enough to trigger the need for a postmarket
study. A determination as to what type of study or methodology the
FDA should mandate where analysis supports requiring
postmarketing testing is beyond the scope of this analysis. In general,
the FDA could require studies ranging from randomized clinical trials
to prospective or retrospective cohort studies (in which a population
is followed forward or backward in time). A randomized controlled
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trial would produce the strongest results, but would need to be
balanced against the reality that controlled trials are more resource
intensive, and that it would be impracticable to require a controlled
206
trial for every possible extrapolation. Moreover, such trials may
sometimes be unethical: given what is now known about the increased
risk of death in elderly patients using Seroquel, it would be unethical
to expose such patients to a controlled trial. Earlier in the drug’s
lifecycle, however, that risk was not yet clear: a trial may well have
averted the ultimate harm done by the continued unchecked use of
the drug in that population. Ultimately, the risk was established in a
meta-analysis of seventeen placebo-controlled trials of atypical
207
antipsychotic drugs. Regardless of the nature of the postmarket
testing, if the agency is going to permit continued use without
warning, additional study is required.
With regard to labeling, should the FDA require ETASU or a
red-box warning? In 2010, the AHRQ evaluated thirty-eight trials on
dementia, six of which compared Seroquel to a placebo. The metaanalysis found a positive, significant difference between the atypical
antipsychotics as a class and the placebo, though the effect was small
208
in magnitude. The pooled estimate of effect for Seroquel was not
209
statistically significant. This evidence suggests that Seroquel is not
effective at treating symptoms associated with dementia in elderly
patients. On the other hand, the AHRQ analysis found “high strength
evidence from meta-analyses that the use of atypical antipsychotics is
associated with an increased risk of death in elderly patients with
dementia and agitation.” In other words, there is no evidence of
benefit, but strong evidence of an increased risk of death. On that
basis, the FDA should issue a red-box warning for this off-label use.
Even under the best of circumstances, FDA analysis and
decisionmaking will not be perfect. Where the risk–benefit analysis is
not clear enough to support a red-box warning, a black- or gray-box
warning will be more appropriate. Further, when the FDA
implements a red-box warning, or withdraws a drug altogether, the
agency should continue monitoring any available data. That may

206. See Robert William Sanson-Fisher et al., Limitations of the Randomized Controlled
Trial in Evaluating Population-Based Health Interventions, 30 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 155,
156–58 (2007).
207. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 176.
208. Maglione et al., supra note 184, at 117.
209. Id.
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occur, for example, if the drug continues to be used in foreign
210
countries. In the event subsequent evidence alters the factors
weighed by the agency to make labeling determinations, the FDA
may need to revise its initial determination in light of an evolving
evidence base.
C. 1-800-GET-THIN!
The Lap-Band Adjustable Gastric Banding System (“LapBand”) is a medical device manufactured by Allergan to promote
weight loss in obese patients. Obesity is determined by body mass
index (BMI), which is calculated by dividing a patient’s weight (in
211
kilograms) by the square of the patient’s height (in meters). The
Lap-Band “restrict[s] the size of the stomach to promote early satiety
212
and appetite control leading to weight loss.” Typically the device is
placed via laparoscopic adjustable gastric banding (LAGB) surgery:
“an inflatable gastric band connected to a reservoir port” is
“implanted to encircle the top portion of the upper stomach creating
213
a smaller stomach pouch.” The Lap-Band can then be adjusted by
deflating or further inflating the band with saline. In the event of
complications or ineffectiveness, the Lap-Band can be removed. The
removal procedure is typically laparoscopic—some can even be
214
performed through a single incision.

210. This would present an opportunity for greater international cooperation among the
FDA and foreign regulatory agencies, such as the European Medicines Agency, and
international organizations, such as the World Health Organization. Similar initiatives have long
been a goal for much of the international community. Ryan Abbott, Overcoming Barriers to a
Global Treaty on Medical Funding and R&D, J. BRAZ. INST. FOR INTEL. PROP 70, 70–76 (2012).
2
211. The following metric is used to categorize patients: Underweight (<18.5 kg/m ), Normal
2
2
2
(18.5 to 24.9 kg/m ), Overweight (25 to 29.9 kg/m ), Obesity I (30 to 43.9 kg/m ), Obesity II (35
2
2
to 39.9 kg/m ), and Extreme Obesity (> 40 kg/m ). See NAT’L HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD INST.,
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION,
AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS: THE EVIDENCE REPORT xiv
(1998), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob_gdlns.pdf. There are limits on the utility
of BMI measurements, which do not, for example, account for muscularity or frame size. Id.
212. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE IMPACT
OF WEIGHT LOSS FROM ADJUSTABLE GASTRIC BANDING ON DIABETES, HYPERTENSION, AND
DYSLIPIDEMIA 1 (2000).
213. Id.
214. While a majority of Lap-Band removal surgeries are laparoscopic, a sizeable minority
of patients undergoing removal surgery have to undergo “open” surgery, with a larger incision
and recovery time. Risks Associated with the Laparoscopic Adjustable Gastric Band, MUSC
HEALTH, http://www.muschealth.com/weightlosssurgery/about/procedures/laprisks.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2014) (“Laparoscopic surgery is not always possible. The surgeon may need to
switch to an ‘open’ method . . . .”).
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Research suggests that the Lap-Band is effective in promoting
weight loss. The Lap-Band was approved in part on the basis of a
three-year, prospective, multicenter, nonrandomized trial with 299
215
subjects. That study found that obese patients lost an average of 60
to 70 percent of their excess weight within one year after their Lap216
Band surgery. Eighty percent of all patients lost at least 30 percent
217
of their excess weight and kept it off for one year. In 2008, a metaanalysis evaluated 104 studies with more than 24,000 patients and
found that patients’ mean excess-weight loss three years after Lap218
Band surgery was 50.2 percent. The authors concluded that “gastric
banding meta-analysis provided evidence that, as a bariatric
procedure, LAGB safely achieves clinically significant, durable
219
weight loss and comorbidity improvement.” In addition to being
effective, the Lap-Band represented a significant improvement over
prior, more invasive bariatric surgical options, which permanently
220
reduced the size of the stomach and shortened the intestines. A
2005 meta-analysis of 147 studies on surgical treatment of obesity
compared the most common gastric bypass procedure (Roux-en-Y
221
gastric bypass) with gastric band surgery.
The patients who

215. The mean excess-weight loss (EWL) one year post–Lap-Band for patients whose
starting BMI was equal to, or greater than, 35 was 60.88 percent with comorbidities and 61.65
percent without comorbidities; the EWL for patients with a BMI less than 35 was 69.34 percent
with comorbidities and 67.57 percent without comorbidities. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
THE LAP-BAND ADJUSTABLE GASTRIC BANDING SYSTEM, SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND
EFFECTIVENESS DATA, at 28 tbl.16 (2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/
pdf/P000008S017b.pdf. The total sample size was 149 patients: 56 patients had a BMI less than
35 with comorbidities; 8 patients had a BMI less than 35 without comorbidities; 71 patients had
a BMI of 35 or more with comorbidities patients; and 14 patients had a BMI of 35 or more
without comorbidities. Id.
216. Id.
217. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Expands Use of Banding System for
Weight Loss (Feb. 16, 2011). The FDA used the 1983 Metropolitan Life Insurance Tables to
determine “estimated ideal weight,” instructing users to “use the midpoint for medium frame.”
See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 215, at 1.
218. Scott A. Cunneen, Review of Meta-Analytic Comparisons of Bariatric Surgery with a
Focus on Laparoscopic Adjustable Gastric Banding, 4 SURG. FOR OBES. AND RELAT. DIS. S47–
S55, S49 (2008).
219. Id.
220. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 215. Two types of gastric bands have been
approved for use in the United States: the Lap-Band Gastric Banding System and the Realize
Gastric Band. Obesity Treatment Devices: FDA Approved Obesity Treatment Devices, U.S.
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedical
Procedures/ObesityDevices/ucm350134.htm (last updated July 8, 2014).
221. Melinda A. Maggard et al., Meta-Analysis: Surgical Treatment of Obesity, 142 ANN.
INTERN. MED. 547, 547–59 (2005).
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underwent gastric bypass had a mortality rate of 0.3 percent across
case series, whereas those who had gastric banding had a 0.02 percent
222
mortality rate. However, Lap-Band does cause a high rate of
adverse events. Complications affect a majority of those who have a
Lap-Band implanted: “more than 70 percent of patients experienced
an adverse event related to LAP-BAND, most often vomiting and
difficulty swallowing. The events ranged from mild to severe but most
223
were mild and resolved quickly.” Other potential problems include
infection, port-related complications, slippage, pouch dilation,
224
stomach ischemia, and erosion. A 2011 search of the FDA adverseevents database for Lap-Bands revealed more than eight-thousand
225
adverse-event reports, including eighty deaths.
The Lap-Band became available outside the United States in
226
July 1994, and the FDA approved domestic clinical trials in 1995.
An estimated fifty thousand patients received a Lap-Band outside the
227
228
United States prior to its FDA approval in 2001. As a condition of
approval, the product sponsor agreed to continue tracking patients
229
from the approval trials for a total of five years of follow up.
Initially, the FDA approved Lap-Bands only in “severely obese
patients with a Body Mass Index (BMI) of at least 40 or a BMI of at
least 35 with one or more severe comorbid conditions, or those who
230
are 100 lbs. or more over their estimated ideal weight.” Additional
criteria included a documented history of failed conservative weight222. Id. at 553 (“The early mortality rate for RYGB was 1.0% (95% CI, 0.5% to 1.9%) in
controlled trials and 0.3% (CI, 0.2% to 0.4%) for case series data. Adjustable gastric banding
had an associated early mortality rate of 0.4% (CI, 0.01% to 2.1%) for controlled trials and
0.02% (97.5% CI, 0% to 0.78%) for case series data.”).
223. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 217.
224. Sandra Arthurs, Yerado Abrahamian, Elizabeth L. Loughren, Jo Carol Hiatt, Robin
Cisneros & Jed Weissberg, New Technology Review Process: The Laparoscopic Adjustable
Gastric Band, 15 THE PERMANENTE J. 4, 56 (Fall 2011).
225. Id.
226. M. Belachew, M. J. Legrand & V. Vincent, History of Lap-Band®: From Dream to
Reality, 11 OBESITY SURGERY 297, 301–02 (2001).
227. Id.
228. Letter from Daniel G. Schultz, Deputy Dir. for Clinical and Review Policy, to Ellen
Duke, President and Chief Exec. Officer, BioEnterics Corp. (Mar. 24, 2000) (amended Apr. 20,
2000; May 3, 2000; Dec. 26, 2000; May 18, 2001; and June 1, 2001), http://www.accessdata.fda
.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf/p000008a.pdf.
229. Id. (“You agreed to continue follow-up on subjects enrolled . . . [in] your
investigational study. These post-approval subjects must be followed for a total of 5 years from
the time of implantation. . . . The results of the post-approval study should be reflected in the
labeling via a PMA supplement when the study is complete.”).
230. Id.
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reduction alternatives and a lifetime commitment to change one’s
231
eating habits. The FDA expressed caution in its letter of approval,
232
stating that the Lap-Band should be a last resort. It was not until
February 2011 that the FDA expanded the use of the Lap-Band to
patients with BMIs as low as 30 if they presented with severe
conditions such as heart disease or diabetes, which put them at the
233
“highest risk of obesity-related complications.” This was narrower
than the indication originally sought by Allergan, which had proposed
expanding use of the Lap-Band to patients with BMIs from 35 to 39
234
without obesity-related conditions.
The Lap-Band is still not
recommended “for non-adult patients, patients with conditions that
may make them poor surgical candidates or increase the risk of poor
results . . . who are unwilling or unable to comply with the required
dietary restrictions, who have alcohol or drug addictions, or who
235
currently are or may be pregnant.”
Since the device’s approval, there has been strong consumer
236
demand for off-label use. That is evidenced, for example, by the
agency’s difficulties contending with “pop-up”–type ambulatory
surgical firms marketing aggressively and promising unrealistic results
with little to no mention of accompanying dietary restrictions, postsurgical compliance, or the Lap-Band’s potential complications. For
example, one weight-loss-surgery business used a “1-800-GET237
THIN” marketing campaign in Southern California. That campaign
utilized advertisements inserts such as “LOSE WEIGHT WITH THE
LAP-BAND! SAFE 1 HOUR, FDA APPROVED,” “Celebrate
Black History Month! Let Your New Life Begin! 1-800-GET-THIN,”
231. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 215.
232. Letter from Daniel G. Schultz, Deputy Dir. for Clinical and Review Policy, to Ellen
Duke, President and Chief Exec. Officer, BioEnterics Corp., supra note 228.
233. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., supra note 217.
234. Id.
235. Find a LAP-BAND® Specialist, LAP-BAND SYSTEM, http://www.lapband.com/find-aspecialist (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
236. In one study of “208 participants . . . 49 (23.6%) rated appearance, 18 (8.7%)
embarrassment, 49 (23.6%) medical condition, 59 (28.4%) health concerns, 13 (6.3%) physical
fitness and 20 (9.6%) physical limitation as the most appropriate motivational statement.”
Marije Libeton, John B. Dixon, Cheryl Laurie & Paul E. O’Brien, Patient Motivation for
Bariatric Surgery: Characteristics and Impact on Outcomes, 14 OBES. SURG. 392, 392 (2004).
237. See Letter from Steven D. Silverman, Dir. of the Office of Compliance of the Ctr. for
Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., to Robert Silverman, Esq., of 1800-GET-THIN,
LLC
(Dec.
12,
2011),
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Enforcement
Actions/WarningLetters/ucm283312.htm (describing various violations related to advertising
campaigns run by 1-800-GET-THIN).
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and promising testimonials, such as “MARCIANO LOST 125
238
POUNDS.” That group claimed that facilities associated with the
239
campaign were “bringing in $21 million a month” in revenue. On
December 11, 2011, the FDA cautioned the group behind “1-800GET-THIN” that its advertisements “fail to reveal material facts,
including relevant risk information regarding the use of the LapBand, age and other qualifying requirements for the Lap-Band
procedure, and the need for the ongoing modification of eating
240
habits, as provided in the approved Lap-Band labeling.” That same
day, several such notices were also sent to related groups heavily
241
promoting the Lap-Band.
D. The Lap-Band Dynamic Extrapolation Approach
The Lap-Band presents numerous regulatory extrapolation
challenges. First, at what BMI should the Lap-Band be used? Was the
FDA too cautious in its earlier BMI indications? Is it still being too
cautious? Should comorbidities be required at lower BMIs? Is there a
legitimate rationale for approval for a BMI of 40 but not 39? Second,
in what populations should the Lap-Band be used? Should it be
242
approved in pediatric populations? Is there an age after which the
risks of the device outweigh the benefits? Should it be used in
pregnant patients? Should it be used in patients who have
comorbidities (for example, a history of mental illness) that cause
them to be excluded from clinical trials? Third, should the Lap-Band
be used indefinitely given that the device was only studied for five
years? Fourth, should alternative medical devices, such as the Realize

238. Id.
239. Stuart Pfeifer, 800-GET-THIN Probe Intensifies, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-omidi-search-warrant-20140605-story.html.
240. Letter from Steven D. Silverman, Dir. of the Office of Compliance of the Ctr. for
Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., to Maria Abaca, of Beverly
Hills Surgery Center LLC (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Enforcement
Actions/WarningLetters/ucm283310.htm.
241. Stuart Pfeifer, Duke Helfand & W.J. Hennigan, FDA Accuses 1-800-GET-THIN of
Using Misleading Lap-Band Ads, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, http://articles.latimes
.com/2011/dec/14/business/la-fi-lap-band-fda-20111214.
242. Lap Band is not currently FDA-approved for use in patients younger than eighteen.
Mikaela Conlet, Lap Band Surgery: Allergan Asks FDA to Approve Obesity Surgery for Teens,
ABC NEWS (May 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/lap-band-maker-allergan-hopesoffer-surgery-teens/story?id=13678820.
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Band, which is manufactured by Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., be
approved based on data for the Lap-Band?
Our Lap-Band case study will discuss only a few of these
extrapolation issues: duration of treatment, follow-on device
approval, and BMI indication. Again, our approach begins with data
collection. Extrapolation determinations would be improved with
data that has not been systematically collected or analyzed, but that
would have been under our framework.
With regard to duration of treatment, there is currently no
evidence that would support limiting the Lap-Band’s duration.
Moreover, limiting the device’s duration of treatment would require a
second surgery to remove the device. At present, clinical guidelines
suggest Lap-Band patients should be seen by a physician three to
eight times the first year, one to four times the second year, and one
244
to two times every year thereafter. However, given that patients are
using this device indefinitely and that the device has been studied
only for five years in a controlled setting, our framework would place
a burden on the manufacturer to continue patient follow-up from
controlled trials indefinitely. Such follow-up might detect new risks
that emerge more than five years after device implantation, or it
might find that known risks become more prevalent years after device
implantation. That evidence would be collected and analyzed
together with a more robust dataset from clinical practice. At present,
there is inadequate safety data for the Lap-Band in light of its actual
245
duration of use.
Lap-Band data was appropriately extrapolated to the Realize
Adjustable Gastric Band. The Realize Band, manufactured by
246
Ethicon, has been marketed in Europe since 1996. It became
available to the European Union and other countries, excluding the
247
United States, in 2004. It was then approved by the FDA on

243. REALIZE Adjustable Gastric Band, ETHICON ENDO-SURGERY, INC. (2009),
http://www.ethicon.com/sites/default/files/loose-documents/09-1089.pdf.
244. S. Sauerland et al., Obesity Surgery: Evidence-Based Guidelines of the European
Association for Endoscopic Surgery (E.A.E.S.), 19 SURGICAL ENDOSCOPY 200, 200–21 (2005).
245. Arthurs et al., supra note 224, at 56.
246. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REALIZE ADJUSTABLE GASTRIC BAND, SUMMARY OF
SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DATA 4 (2007), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Advisory
Committees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/MedicalDevices/MedicalDevicesAdvisory
Committee/Gastroenterology-UrologyDevicesPanel/UCM302775.pdf.
247. Id.
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September 28, 2007. Its parameters resemble the original Lap-Band
indications: a BMI of 40 or greater, or a BMI of 35 or greater plus a
249
comorbidity. In addition to a review of Lap-Band data and data
from the Realize Band’s international use, the FDA required a threeyear U.S. clinical study. That study implanted the Realize Band in 276
patients with at least a five-year history of morbid obesity who had
250
exhausted nonsurgical weight-reduction efforts. The results and
251
adverse events were comparable to those of the Lap-Band. The
FDA also required a postapproval study with five years of follow252
up. Given a lack of evidence to suggest a clinical difference between
the Lap-Band and the Realize Band, it would appear appropriate for
the FDA to approve the Realize Band for the same indications as the
Lap-Band, but to require Ethicon to continue monitoring its trial
patients. Expanded data collection will be able to alert the FDA to
risks if a significant difference emerges between the two devices in
practice.
Determining the appropriate BMI indication is more
challenging. The following factors are relevant: First, the amount of
off-label use has not been well quantified, but there are indications
253
that Lap-Band was commonly used outside of its approved BMI.
Second, off-label use here is along a continuous variable (BMI) and
small in magnitude. Third, adverse events were relatively frequent
and ranged from mild to severe. Fourth, there is a large population of
248. Id.
249. Realize Patient Guide, ETHICON ENDO-SURGERY, available at https://www
.jnjgatewayifu.com/eLabelingContent/Ees/USENG/IFU_74120_Rev_A_REALIZE_PATIENT
_GUIDE_44365.pdf (2008).
250. All were at least one-hundred pounds overweight or 1.5 times their ideal body weight
(IBW), from eighteen to sixty years of age, with a BMI greater than or equal to 40, or a BMI of
35 and an obesity-related comorbidity. Subjects were observed for three years: their mean EWL
was 38 percent after one year; 44.7 percent after two years, and 41.1 percent at the end of the
three years. The trial defined comorbidities as “type 2 diabetes, hyperlipidemia, obstructive
sleep apnea, hypertension, metabolic syndrome, or osteoarthritis of the hip or knee” that “were
generally expected to be improved, reversed, or resolved by weight loss.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., supra note 246, at 15.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Kathleen Doheny, Bariatric Surgery Helps People Who Are Less Obese,
WEBMD (June 16, 2011), http://www.webmd.com/diet/weight-loss-surgery/news/20110616/
study-bariatric-surgery-works-for-less-obese-people; T.H. Inge, S.A. Xanthakos & M.H. Zeller,
Bariatric Surgery for Pediatric Extreme Obesity: Now or Later?, 31 INT’L J. OBESITY 1 (2007);
Paul E. O’Brien et al., Laparoscopic Adjustable Gastric Banding in Severely Obese Adolescents:
A Randomized Trial, 303 JAMA 6, 519–26 (2010) (describing a study using the Lap-Band in
which the participants had a BMI of 35 or higher, but did not necessarily have a comorbidity).
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potential off-label users. Fifth, the Lap-Band treats obesity and
related comorbidities, including type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure,
high cholesterol, and obstructive sleep apnea, which are serious
conditions. Sixth, unlike traditional and irreversible bariatric
surgeries, the Lap-Band procedure is reversible.
Our framework suggests that the FDA may have been too
cautious with its initial approval of Lap-Band—which limited the
device to patients with a BMI of 40, or 35 with one or more severe
comorbid conditions. Off-label use for a lower BMI is along a
continuous variable; absent data suggesting a sudden shift in
outcomes between a BMI of 34 and 35, there is not necessarily a
strong theoretical justification for that cutoff. Further, this off-label
use is occurring in the “hump” of the distribution. The extrapolation
population size of off-label users is sufficiently large to ensure a
vibrant dataset for postmarket data collection. As opposed to
conventional irreversible surgeries, in the event postmarket data
revealed unexpected risks related to Lap-Band, the device could be
removed. Our framework suggests that the Lap-Band could have
been initially approved for either its 2011 indication, namely patients
with a BMI of 30 to 34 presenting the highest risk of obesity-related
complications, or its 2013 indications, namely patients with a BMI of
30 to 40 with at least one obesity-related comorbidity. Our framework
would also put a higher burden on manufacturers to conduct
postmarket studies in these populations. The FDA could have
approved the device for lower BMIs as conditional off-label uses,
subject to the product sponsor completing its PMR according to
agreed-upon timelines.
Extrapolation from more comprehensive data on off-label use
might have permitted earlier expansion of Lap-Band indications and
earlier approval of the Realize Band. Approval of the Lap-Band for a
lower BMI would have allowed more patients to benefit at an earlier
stage of obesity. Approval of the Realize Band at an early stage might
also have lowered healthcare costs by facilitating competition.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for an evolutionary approach to drug and
medical device regulation. Our goal has been to move evidence-based
policymaking toward Bayesianism. At its most fundamental level,
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To apply Bayesian
Bayes’ Law is the science of learning.
decisionmaking, one needs to form a prior belief based on existing
evidence, gather additional information, and then update the prior
255
belief. Our proposals are Bayesian because they force policymakers
to assess and acknowledge the imperfect nature of their prior beliefs;
gather, when cost-effective, additional information; and take action in
terms of approvals, reimbursements, and enforcement based on
continual updating. This Article advocates putting Bayesianism into
regulatory practice.
Although we have focused our attention on FDA regulations,
our evolutionary evidence-based approach to policymaking has
application to virtually any area of government decisionmaking. For
example, the National Transportation Safety Board has
recommended that states consider a kind of criminal-law
extrapolation that would expand the scope of Driving Under the
Influence (DUI) liability by lowering the blood-alcohol level that
256
would trigger a criminal violation. In fact, one can imagine DUI
extrapolations that would be directly analogous to the four forms of
medical extrapolation discussed
above. First, “diagnosis
extrapolation” occurs when the coverage (elements) of a crime are
expanded to punish related behaviors (for example, expanding DUI
laws to cover different blood-alcohol levels or to cover additional
drugs). Second, “patient extrapolation” occurs when the coverage
(elements) of a crime are expanded to punish a new population (for
example, expanding DUI laws to cover younger drivers). Third,
“dosage extrapolation” occurs when the punishments’ durations are
changed (for example, altering the DUI punishment by changing the
length of incarceration or suspending licenses). Finally, “treatment
extrapolation” occurs when the punishments are changed to related
kinds of interventions (for example, changing the content of
mandatory driver-education classes, or the conditions of
imprisonment or supervised release). Any legal reform that
extrapolates the size of a mandate, the class to which it applies, or the
consequences of noncompliance, might be ripe for our evolutionary
evidence-based approach.
254. See JACKMAN, supra note 11.
255. See Simon Jackman, Bayesian Analysis for Political Research, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
483, 483 (2004); see also JACKMAN, supra note 11.
256. NAT’L TRANS. SAFETY BD., REACHING ZERO: ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE ALCOHOLIMPAIRED DRIVING (May 14, 2013), http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2013/SR1301.pdf (last
visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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Just as the FDA sometimes requires drug testing before
regulatory approval, lawmakers at times should test legal reforms
before enactment. Indeed, one of us has argued that we should
sometimes “randomize law”—that is, lawmakers should conduct
randomized controlled trials to assess the causal impact of legal
257
reform before adopting a reform on a permanent basis. But at other
times, the urgency of the present precludes gathering all relevant
evidence before enactment. In such circumstances, evidentiary
extrapolation coupled with dynamic, Bayesian updating is the best
way forward.

257. See Ian Ayres, Yair J. Listokin & Michael Abramowicz, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 929, 1005 (2011) (“Randomized experimentation offers a powerful means to evaluate
the effects of proposed policies. By applying laws and policies to different groups on a random
basis, the causal impacts of the law can be isolated from other factors that would ordinarily be
correlated with exposure to different policies.”); see also Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Throw
Away the Jail or Throw Away the Key?: The Effect of Punishment on Recidivism and Social
Cost 1 (June 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2014/defigueiredo.pdf) (examining “the effectiveness of . . . sanctions in curbing recidivism and vehicle
crashes with some 200,000 alcohol tests”).

